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ABSTRACT 
On the Effectiveness of Agricultural Land-Use Controls 
by 
Eric Tarquin Marnell, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 1983 
Major Professor: Dr. W. Cris Lewis 
Department: Economics 
vii 
Land resources are a valuable resource in the economic system. 
There exists considerable controversy surrounding the allocation of land 
into the competing land uses. At the heart of this controversy are 
agricultural land resources. The purpose of this paper is to investi-
gate, first theoretically and second empirically, the effectiveness of 
controls placed on land use to keep land in agricultural production. 
A theoretical conclusion is reached as to whether the free market 
or 1 and-use controls all ocate 1 and resources more efficiently. An 
empirical model is formulated to explain changes in the quantity of 
agricultural 1 and as a function of several hypothesized explanatory 
variables, one of which is a land-control dummy variable to measure the 
effectiveness of agricultural land-use controls. 
The general conclusion reached is that for the most part, the 
controls have been ineffective. Where they have been effective in 
i nfl uenci ng 1 and-use a 11 ocati on, questions sti 11 exist concerning the 
cost imposed upon society from the control influenced 1 and a 11 ocati on. 
(101 pages) 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The conversion of agricultural land to urban and other uses 
continues t o be a topic of considerable controversy. The heart of the 
controversy is embodied in arguments concerning the national supply of 
agricultural land, especially cropland. With a total crop l and ba se in 
the United States of approximately 450 million acres, high stakes are 
involved for the production from that cropland represents a large input 
i nto and has a large effect on our economic system. Few can oppose the 
argument that this valuable resource has to be allocated efficiently. 
However, di sagreements exist as to what is meant by an efficient 
a 11 ocati on of 1 and. 
The purpose of the thesis is to study the effectiveness of 
agr i cultural land-use controls in stopping or reducing conversion losses 
from t he t ota 1 crop 1 and base. The purpose of this introductory chapter 
is to present arguments for and against agricultural land-use controls. 
A conclusion is reached as to whether the control -influenced land 
all otation is theoretically superior to a market allocation of 1 and. 
The Market Allocation of Land 
----
The goal of any economic system is, whether it be social is tic or 
capitalistic in structure, to allocate resources (i.e., land, labor, and 
capital) to meet some predefined objectives. In a competitive market 
facing competing objectives for resources, it can be shown that such 
decisions will lead to an allocation of resources which is Pareto 
efficient in the absence of externalities, cell ecti ve goods, and any 
monopolistic or monopsonistic elements. 
The concept of Pareto efficiency has one drawback; it takes as 
given the existing income distribution, thereby, ignoring any equity 
considerations. However, accounting for equity is not straightforward 
for who is truly qualified to determine the most equitable income 
distribution? With less than perfect knowledge about the effects of 
income equalization measures on work effort (it depends on the initial 
assumptions about the marginal utility of income and the marginal 
utility of 1 ei sure), equity considerations reduce to va 1 ue judgements 
about what the distribution of income should be. Taken too far, 
attempts to achieve an "equitable" distribution of income may reduce 
work effort and income. The market will therefore all ocate resources 
efficiently. Pareto efficiency is a powerful operational concept aiding 
the resource rea 11 ocati on process. 
The decentralized decisions inherent in a competitive market will 
result in almost continual resource reallocation. Some industries 
expand while others decline. For example, Table 1 illustrates, for the 
most part, market induced employment changes for selected industries 
between June, 1972 and June, 1982. While the social system is sensitive 
to the problems associated with these economic adjustments, they are 
viewed as necessary to the efficient operation of the economic system. 
With economi c efficiency, resources or factors of production are allowed 
to move to their highest value or best use. Decentralized market 
TABLE 1. 
CHANGES IN INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT, JUNE (1972) TO JUNE (1982) 
Emp 1 oyment 
Industry June (1972) June (1982) 1972·1982 Changes 
1. 011 and Gas Extraction 264,000 717,400 +453. 000 
2. Medical Instruments and Supplies 93,200 161,300 + 68,600 
3. Newspapers 377,100 425.300 + 48,200 
4. Engineering and Scientific Instruments 64,300 76.000 + 12,000 
5. Copper Ores 38.900 24,300 • 14,000 
6. Highway and Street Construction 363,800 251,800 ·112,000 
7. Blast Furnaces and Basic Steel Products 586,200 410,500 ·184,000 
8. Motor Vehicles and Equipment 896,400 709.900 ·186 ,400 
SOURCES: U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and 
Earnings: September 1972, Vol . 19, No 3. -
U.S., Department of labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings : 
September 1982, Yo 1. 29, No. 6. ----
w 
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decisions facilitate this process by allowing individuals to maximize 
welfare and firms to maximize profit. 
Economics of Land 
To debate the issue of the optimal use of a particular resource 
such as 1 and requires agreement on the objective function to be maxi-
mized. It is submitted that the objective is to arrive at the alloca-
tion of land that maximizes the aggregate value of all land rents. The 
economic rent on any resource wil 1 reflect its net contribution to 
national income for the time period specified and its worth to society. 
By maximizing rents, the objective of maximizing national income is 
achieved. 
To achieve the objective, land is continually being converted and 
reconverted among uses as market conditions change. This is in response 
to price signals generated in the land market reflecting society's land-
use preferences. With 1 and resource mobi 1 ity, resources are free to 
move to their highest and best use. Therefore, the reallocation of land 
among the various land uses that would take place in the market is 
optimal since the objective of maximizing national income is achieved. 
The market allocation is optimal (provided there are no significant 
distortions), since society it is able to capture larger rents (may or 
may not imply speculation) by foregoing land uses that yield a lower 
rent and by adopting those land uses with a larger rent. 
Arguments for ~ Nonmarket Land A 11 ocati on 
Agricultural land-use controls substitute government allocation for 
the market process. They are a nonmarket tool initiated in the 
political arena that attempts to allocate or influence the allocation of 
land among the competing land uses. Many arguments are offered in 
support of a nonmarket allocation of agricultural land. The first 
argument relates to externalities. Open space associated with 
agricultural land use may provide positive aesthetic benefits or 
externalities for urban residents. 
A second argument is that the market may not guarantee an adequate 
supp 1 y of agri cultura 1 1 and. Recent 1 y, 1 arge conversion 1 osses from the 
tota 1 crop 1 and base have been reported.l If agri cultura 1 1 and supp 1 i es 
are decreasing, possible food shortages may result. If growth trends in 
world population persist along with the inadequacy of the vast majority 
of underdeveloped countries to meet their own domestic food requirements 
for self-sufficiency, severe world food shortages may result. Under 
this scenario, the United States caul d have reduced the food shortage 
impact by insuring an "adequate" supply of agricultural land that would 
make the export of larger quantities of agricultural products practical 
while at the same time limiting the impact on the domestic food market. 
Another argument for agricultural land-use controls is the alleged 
difference between private and public 1 and holder discount rates. If 
private holder discount rates are greater than public holder rates, 
private holders have a shorter planning horizon. This implies private 
holders are acting out of self-interest against the wishes of society, 
which the public holders are representing by a lower discount rate. 
Private holder discount rates do not reflect social time preference. 
------ys~~--R~b~rt E. Coughlin and John c. Keene, 
Agricultural Lands Study. The Protection of Farmland: 
State and Locar-tOv~ts:-!Amherst, Massachusetts: 
ResearCh rnsiTtute, 1981 ), p. 16. 
eds., Nation a 1 
A Reference for 
Reg10na 1 Sc1 ence 
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Therefore, the private holder rate would underallocate land to decisions 
facilitate this process by allowing individuals to maximize agricultural 
production, thereby ignoring the preferences of society. Cell ecti ve 
goods are another argument for agricultural 1 and-use controls. 
Collective goods have two fundamental characteristics: 1 l the 
impossibility of excluding consumers who do not pay for the good in 
question (nonexclusion), and 2) consumption by one consumer occurs 
without reducing the quantity of the good available for other consumers 
(nonrival consumption). The market will not allocate the socially 
optimal quantity because of these two characteristics. If local 
economic benefits derived from an agricultural economy may be classified 
as a call ecti ve good, the market will not all ocate an efficient amount 
of land for agricultural land use. Agricultural land-use controls are 
justified to allocate land to agriculture if collective goods exist with 
agricultural land use. 
If agricultural product and factor markets are not absolutely 
competitive, monopoly and/or monopsony elements exist. Economics has 
demonstrated how the pricing behavior of monopolists and monopsonists 
differ from that of the competitive market. For monopolists and 
monopsonists, price is determined as output decisions are reached. With 
respect to the land market, agricultural land-use controls might offset 
the socially inefficient pricing behavior. A second best sol uti on may 
be obtai ned. 
Another argument is presented with the belief that food is a merit 
good. Food is considered a merit good if it is believed to be such a 
basic human need that the private land market should not be allowed to 
determine the acreage devoted to food production. Food and fiber should 
be provided to all as a "right" and should not be governed by market 
criteria .2 Instead, nonmarket criteria should allocate acreage for food 
production . 
The last argument stresses the point that once conversion of 
agricultural land to other uses has taken place conversion back to 
agriculture is nearly impossible (irreversibility). 
Against Nonmarket A 11 ocati on 
Externalities are associated with some agricultural uses of land, 
but most of these are negative externalities that are supporting the 
notion that too much, not too little, land is in agricultural use. 
These negative externa lti ties inc 1 ude the 1 eachi ng of po 11 utants from 
chemica 1 ferti 1 i zers and organic waste into underground acqui fers and 
surface watercourses, noise and odors from dairy and feed 1 ot 
operations, and the interference of farm machinery on roadways with 
faster moving vehicles such as automobiles. These can result in 
marginal social cost exceeding price with the conclusion that too many 
resources are being devoted to farm production. 
Open space may provide positive aesthetic benefits for urban 
residents. However, other aesthetic benefits may exist. For examp 1 e, 
housing developments can generate positive externalities. Urban 
residents in less affluent neighborhoods may drive through expensive 
housing districts, deriving pleasure from observing a quality of housing 
superior to their own. 
If negative externalities predominate for agricultural uses of 
-----2~~l~~~~h-B. Gardner, "The Economics of Agri cu 1 tura 1 Land Preser-
vation," American Journa 1 of Agri cu ltura 1 Economics (Dec. 1977) : 1029. 
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1 and, the externalities argument forwarded for agricultural land-use 
controls is weak. The valuation of all aesthetic preferences involved 
would be useful so that comparisons could be made.3 
Arguments suggesting the future supply of agricultural 1 and may be 
greatly reduced and unable to meet food requirements are lacking 
sufficient evidence. Projecting future economic activity is highly 
inaccurate. One only has to look at the poor performances of economists 
in forecasting future Gross National Product to see this. With respect 
to the supply of agricultural land, a simple example can be generated by 
citing trends that, when extrapolated far enough, result in a zero 
farmland base or at 1 east an "inadequate" farmland base at some future 
date. To assess the future on the basis of an extrapolation of any 
historic trend is in error. Such an extrapolation will show what will 
happen if the conditions that brought about the trend in the first place 
continue into the future. To illustrate the errors inherent to that 
process, past data (1930-1978) on total cropland and agricultural labor 
were each regressed on time. The estimated equations were used to make 
an extrapolation of future values. Trends in the agricultural land base 
are summarized in Table 2. 
The estimated equation for agricultural land is: 
(1) AL = 476.02- 0.24T 
where AL is total cropland in mill ions of acres, and Tis a time index 
-----30~~-i-d-S-.-Brookshire, Berry C. I ves, and Wi 11 i am D. Schu 1 ze, "The 
Valuation of Aesthetic Preferences," Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management 3 (1976) : 325-346. --- -
Year 
1910 
1920 
1930 
1940 
1950 
1959 
1969 
1978 
TABLE 2 
CROPLAND IN THE UNITED STATES, 1910-78 
Cropland 1n Crops 
Total 4 Change4 
320 --
368 48 
382 14 
368 -14 
377 9 
359 -18 
333 -26 
361 +28 
Percentage 
Change 
--
15 . 0 
3.8 
-3.7 
2.4 
-4.8 
- 7.2 
+8 . 4 
Total Cropland 
Tota 1 a Change4 
437 
380 43 
480 --
467 -13 
478 +11 
458 -20 
472 +14 
454 -18 
Percentage 
Change 
9.8 
-2.7 
2. 4 
2.4 
-4.1 
3.1 
-3 . 8 
SOURCES : U.S. , Depar tment of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics: 198D, 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 419. --
U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Agr1culture Su!Miary 
and State Data : 1978, Vol. 1, pt. 51, Table 1, (WaS'Jil"'nnton. D.C. : Gover~ 
P'rTnfTri'gD~ 1'9ii0r; p. 1. 
"' 
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(i.e. , T = 1 for 1930, T = 2 for 1931, etc . ).4 The equation is an The 
new e xtrapolation suggesting a long term trend reduction of 240,000 
acres of land per year f rom the cropland ba se. Given the cropland base 
of the United States, the country waul d run out of cropland in about 
2000 years. 
The trend equation for farm labor is : 
(2) FL 13 ,070- 191.6T 
where FL is the agricultural 1 abor force measured in thousands of 
workers, and Tis the same time index used in equation (1 ).5 The trend 
has been a reduction in agricultural labor of about 191,600 workers per 
year. Th i s trend, if projected, would have the country running out of 
agricultural workers in the year 1998. The trends implied by these 
relationships suggest that by 1998, no workers wil 1 be farming 459 
million acres of land! 
In the market society determines the amount of 1 and to be devoted 
to a particular use, such as agriculture, by voting with dollar votes. 
These dollar votes are reflected in land-use prices. A higher land-use 
price implies that society is attaching more dollar votes to a land use. 
If society desires more 1 and in agricultural production more dollar 
votes waul d be devoted to agricultural 1 and use which waul d in turn 
increase agricultural land prices. Through market prices, society will 
determine the optima 1 quantity of 1 and for each competing 1 and use in 
-----4Th~-~~~~~ions were estimated from annual data. See Cris W. Lewis 
and Eric T. Marnell, "Agricultural Land Use and Land-Use Controls," Utah 
Science, Summer 1982. If estimated from the data in Table 2, the 
agricultural land equation becomes: AL = 477.8 - 0.676T. This equation 
is suggestive of a long term trend reduction of 676,000 acres per year, 
with the country running out of agricultural land in about 700 years, 
p. 52. 
5
rbid. 
11 
order to ma ximize welfare. 
Agri cultural land-use controls stand in contrast to this process. 
They ignore the market generated price signals reflecting society's 
land-use desires. The controls would overallocate land to agricultural 
production based on the belief that the interests of future generations 
are not being looked out for and that past and current supplies of 
agricultural land have been and are inadequate. 
As to the possibility of food shortages, the probability of that 
occuring in the United States is essentially zero. World food shortages 
are not only a possibility but a distinct reality for many persons. 
Very few areas of the world today are exempt from periodic food 
shortages. Unfortunately for some areas, food shortages are a 
continuing problem. 
With a hypothesized growing world population, the export demand for 
United States agricultural products is expected to increase in the 
future . The importance of these exports in alleviating possible world 
food shortages is not significant. To claim that these exports, "mean 
the difference between 1 i fe and death to mi 11 ions of 1 ess fortunate 
people whose 1 ives are marred by chronic hunger,"6 is incorrect . 
According to Raup (1982 ): 
... it is clear that the vast bulk of U.S. grain exports goes 
to feed livestock in countries that are not, by world food 
standards, among the impoverished. In short, young American 
families are being asked to forgo their homes 
7
in the suburbs 
so that American farmers can feed Russian cows. 
-----6~jl-l-l~~-A. Fishcel, "The Urbanization of Agricultural Land : A 
Review of the National Agricultural Lands Study," Land Economics 58 (May 
1982): 258. 
7Ibid., p. 258. 
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In order for U.S . exports to help alleviate possible world food 
sh or tages, what is required is a shifting of current e xport pattern s. 
Although there is no general consensus as to the appropriate dis-
count rate today, there is general concern that the low rates attributed 
by public holders may not reflect the current economic environment and 
may distort land-use decisions. To more accurately represent the 
discount rate, it is argued that the current opportunity cost of 
captialbe considered. With empirical research demonstrating that actual 
public holder discount rates are far below the calculated opportunity 
cost of capital ,investigation should be directed toward finding the true 
economic costs incurred by low public holder discount rates.8 
To argue for the existence of collective goods associated with 
agricultural land uses, requires evidence. With evidence lacking, the 
collective good argument does not appear to be relevant since food and 
fiber product industries do not di sp 1 ay co 11 ecti ve good characteristi cs. 
Neither is any evidence presented suggesting that monopolistic and 
monopsonistic e 1 ements dominate the agri cu ltura 1 product and factor 
markets . These markets are characterized by a high degree of 
competition, perhaps more so than for any other sector in the economy. 
Finally, the merit good argument is not convincing since value 
judgements are to be made when considering a good for merit good status. 
With arguments presented for and against agricultural 1 and-use controls, 
a conclusion may be reached as to the theoretically more efficient land-
use allocation method. 
-----8$~~-E~l~- T. Marnell, "Water Project Evaluation: A Review of the 
Narrows Project, Colorado," University of Col ora do, December 1980. 
13 
Conclusions 
Agricultural lands are a valuable natural resource, but are not the 
only valuable resource in the economic system. In a system that prizes 
economic freedom, to claim that agricultural 1 ands must be preserved 
requires proof that society would be better off by that decision. 
Through the presentation of arguments for and against agricultural 1 and-
use controls, it was argued that a competitive market best determines 
the optimal allocation of 1 and. Unless there is strong contrary 
evidence, land-use changes should be viewed as a demonstration that the 
economic system is working. That is, resources are being reallocated to 
the uses that are valued more highly by society. Justified or not, 
agricultural land-use controls exist and are being used. Given their 
existence, the objective of the remainder of the thesis will be to 
empirically investigate the effectiveness of agricultural land-use 
controls. 
Thesis Objectives 
The objectives of the thesis are to : 
1. Measure the extent of state land-use controls; and 
2. Test the effectiveness of state and county agricultural 
1 and-use contro 1 s. 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II describes the variety of 
agricultural 1 and-use control 1 aws. The controls are classified into 
two categories for the purpose of the thesis: direct controls and 
indirect controls. In Chapter Ill 1 iterature on the subject is 
reviewed. A mathematical model is developed in Chapter IV. The purpose 
14 
is to illustrate possible consumer and producer economic reactions to 
changes in certain variables that may ultimately affect land-use 
demands. Chapter V presents empirical models to estimate agricultural 
land-use direct control effectiveness. The empirical results are 
analyzed in Chapter VI. The important conclusion and policy 
implications are summarized in Chapter VII. 
A summary of direct and indirect land-use control measures for each 
state responding to the survey constitutes the appendix. 
CHAPTER II 
LAND-USE CONTROLS 
15 
In the late 1960's and early 1970's, land-use planning received 
increasing attention from those individuals concerned with national 
land-use trends. The trends depicted a shifting pattern among the land 
uses away from agricultural to other uses. Operating with the belief 
that reductions in agricultural land-use were not socially desireable, 
1 and-use p 1 anni ng and agri cul tura 1 1 and-use contro 1 s were 1 ooked upon to 
reverse this trend. Collective action on the part of these concerned 
i ndi vi dua 1 s was necessary to bring about 1 and-use p 1 anni ng si nee there 
numbers were small. A starting point was the political arena . There, 
the purpose of the collective action was to apply pressure on 
po 1 i ti ci ans to enact 1 and-use p 1 anni ng 1 egis 1 ati on. To support their 
arguments, statistics relating to agri cu 1 tura 1 1 and conversion rates 
were cited. With the general electorate subjected to large publicity 
campaigns, numerous county and state agencies came under increasing 
pressure to adopt agricultural 1 and-use controls, in one form or 
another, to preserve agricultural 1 and. The purpose of this chapter 
will be to outline these controls on agricultural land use. Direct 
controls, or controls that have a direct influence on agricultural land 
use, are outlined first since the thesis is measuring their 
effectiveness. An out 1 i ne of indirect contro 1 s then fo 11 ows. 
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Direct Controls 
Agricultural Districting 
This designates specific tracts of land for long-term agricultural 
uses and is usually coupled with benefits and assurances to improve the 
conditions for farming. In most cases, no legally binding controls are 
imposed on land use. Contracts are usually signed by those individuals 
desiring that a district be formed with the contract being for some 
specified period of time. However, if an individaul no longer wishes 
to be in the district he or she may get out of the contract commitment 
since district participation is voluntary. The ease with which an 
individual may get out of the contract colll11itment will depend upon at 
1 east two factors; the proposed 1 and use change and the 1 ocati on of the 
land within the district. 
Agricultural Zoning 
A legally binding designation of land uses, including amount, type, 
and 1 ocation of any development, is imposed with zoning. Agricultural 
zoning restricts land uses exclusively to agricultural and/or related 
uses . Often a 1 arge minimum 1 ot size (10-160 acres) is called for in 
the zone to discourage subdivision, thereby, continuing its agricultural 
homogeneity. Zoning changes are not impossible for an individual parcel 
of land. The degree of success would depend on, among other things, the 
landowners economic, political, and religious power or influence in the 
COITI11Uni ty. 
Purchase and Resale or Lease with Restrictions 
---------
This involves the purchase of 1 and by government agencies, the 
17 
imposition of restrictions on its use and development, and resale back 
to any i ntere s ted parties at the market price. The end result is 
equivalent to the purc hase of development rights. 
Purchase of Development Rights 
A designated agency purchases the development rights from 
1 andowner s of specific parcels, 1 eaving the 1 andowner all other rights 
of ownership. The price of the rights is the dimunition in the market 
value of the 1 and as a result of 1 ass of the development rights. The 
remaining value of the land is the farm use value. 
Indirect Controls 
Comprehensive Planning 
A process, usually political in nature, 1 eading to adoption of a 
set of interrelated policies regarding 1 and use, transportation, 
housing, public facilities, and economic and social issues. It may or 
may not include a land-use plan designating particular land uses. In 
most states, the plan i n itself is not legally binding on governments or 
individuals. Instead, it serves as a set of suggested guidelines to 
follow. A few states do require that zoning and major public facility 
plans be consistent with their comprehensive plans. 
Development Permit System 
Requires that a special permit be acquired for development from the 
appropriate state or regional agency. The development permits are in 
addition to normal local zoning and building permits. The flow of 
development permits may be restricted if additional development is 
deemed undesi reabl e. A si mi 1 a r approa ch waul d be to place an uppe r 
18 
1 imit on the total number of construction permits to be issued during a 
given time period. The most drastic step would be to place a total 
moratorium on all building. 
Differential Property Tax Assessment 
Different assessments are applied to agricultural lands in an 
attempt to keep them in agricultural use. Assessments are based on the 
farm use value of the land rather than on its current market value which 
reflects its development potential. The three major types of 
differential assessment are: (1) pure preferential assessment, (2) 
deferred taxation, and (3) restrictive agreements. 
Pure preferential assessment is a reassessment of eligible land on 
the basis of its current farm use value rather than its market value. 
Deferred taxation is similar to pure preferential assessment, except 
that if land is converted to a noneligible use, a penalty is imposed on 
the landowner consisting of the taxes he or she were excused from paying 
for some specified number of years plus an interest penalty. The 
pena 1 ty sum can be quite 1 arge. 
Restrictive agreements require participants to sign a contract with 
a designated public agency stipulating that the 1 and wi 11 be devoted to 
an e 1 i gi b 1 e use during the contract 1 ength (typi ca 11 y ten years). The 
participant then receives a current use value assessment on his or her 
land. Penal ties similar to those of deferred taxation are imposed when 
land use is changed to a noneligible use. 
Nuisance Legislation (Right to Farm) 
This is usually embodied in legislation seeking to limit private 
anti-farm nuisance lawsuits stating that state and local legislation 
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cannot be used to restrict "normal" day-to-day farming practices unless 
they endanger public health or safety. 
Transfer of Development Rights 
Development rights in an area designated for preservation may be 
purchased by a developer and transferred to a designated growth area. 
To begin additional development in the growth area, development rights 
must be purchased from landowners in the preservation area, thus, 
offering preservation area landowners at least partial compensation for 
the monetary 1 oss they are incurring. 
Conclusions 
The controls outlined above are not a complete listing of available 
controls. They are general categories with many control variations 
possbile in each. At a minimum, there are two purposes for their 
presentation. First, they are presented so that the 1 iterature review 
of Chapter III may be more easily followed. More importantly, they are 
presented so that a better foundation for a more complete understanding 
of the controversy surrounding agricultural 1 and-use controls and the 
remainder of the thesis may be developed. 
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CIIAPITR II I 
REVIEW OF LIITRATURE 
The literature review revealed the lack of empirical work on the 
effectiveness of agricultural land-use controls. The purpose of this 
chapter is to: (1) review the 1 iterature on agricultural 1 and-use 
contra 1 s, and (2) to identify areas where this 1 i terature is i ncomp 1 ete. 
To accomplish this, the chapter is divided into two parts . In the 
first, nonempirical research in the field is summarized. In the second, 
empirical research is summarized followed by comments on suggested 
empirical work to provide insight into the effectiveness of agricultural 
1 and-use controls. 
Nonempirical Research 
Coughlin, Berry and Plaut9 analyze differential property tax 
assessment for agricultural land as a means for controlling land use. 
They argue that differential assessment is an indirect land-use control 
in that landowners are provided with an incentive to keep their land in 
either open space uses or in agriculture, but they are not prohibited 
from development. As urbanization increases, property taxes rise 
sharp ly capturing the land's speculative value. With taxes rising and 
income from agricultural land uses remaining relatively constant, 
-----9R~b~~~-~~-Cough 1 in, David Berry, and Thomas P 1 aut, "Differentia 1 
Assessment of Rea 1 Property as an Incentive to Open Space ?reservati on 
and Farmland Retention," National Tax Journal, (June 1978), pp. 165- 179. 
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agricultural 1 andowners face an increasing tax burden. They argue that 
by itself, differential assessment does not appear to be an effective 
tool for keeping land in agricultural use. Participants in differential 
assessment programs tend to be 1 ocated outside areas of strong urban 
pressure (the rura 1-urban fringe), suggesting that, farmland owners in 
these areas have been reluctant to 1 imit their development options. 
Farmers further away from the development fringe area are more likely to 
engage in a differential assessment program since they have less to 
gain. Differential assessment must complement other measures for it to 
be useful in keeping land in agriculture. Rollback penalties should be 
provided that incorporate an interest rate charge so that 1 andowners 
have not received, in effect, a tax free loan on the difference between 
their land's speculative and current use values. 
MasonlO analyzes the transfer of development rights (TDR) as a 
land-use control. He argues that a TDR program is an extension of 
zoning. An area is considered for a TDR program when it is experiencing 
development pressure. If such pressure exists, the area is split into a 
growth area and a preservation area. To further develop, 1 andowners in 
the growth area must secure development rights from 1 an downers in the 
preservation area. A potentia 1 prob 1 em with a TDR program is that the 
compensation received by owners in the preservation area is likely to be 
less from what they would receive in a competitive market outcome, 
because growth area 1 andowners have an incentive to underestimate or 
underbid the value of preservation area development rights. Preserva-
-----16(;~~~-M~~on, "The Deregulation of Urban Land Markets: A Note on 
A 1 ternati ves to Zoning," The Anna 1 s of Region a 1 Science, (Ju 1 y 1979 ), 
pp. 54-65. 
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ti on area 1 an downers wou 1 d incur a 1 ass of potentia 1 income. By recog-
nizing the potential problems in setting up a market for preservation 
area development rights, Mason concludes that TOR programs have a 
definite advantage over zoning--in that limited development is permitted 
with at 1 east parti a 1 compensation for those affected. Whether or not 
to implement such a program depends on the costs involved. 
Barrows and Prenguber11 submit that traditional zoning is 
inadequate because the "windfall-wipeout" dilemma is created. The 
windfall-wipeout dilemma occurs when an area or parcel of land is zoned 
for an activity that would yield a lower development value for its 
landowner. For example, this would occur if land that is not zoned and 
had a market value of $15,000 per acre and then was zoned for 
agricultural use only. The land then may be worth only $1,500 per acre. 
The 1 andowner suffers a "wipeout" 1 ass of $13,500 per acre since the 
1 ass is uncompensated. For this reason, the authors argue that a TOR 
program is superior to traditional zonin~ 
Barrow's and Prenguber's study the problems that may be caused by 
development around an interstate highway exchange had a TOR program been 
in effect. Like Mason12 they submit that attempts to create a private 
development rights market are full of uncertainties. In order for this 
market to be created, a very sophisticated and highly trained planning 
agency would be called for. They conclude that TOR is a promising 
concept needing further empi rica 1 research. 
-----llR-i-~h~~d- L. Barrows and Bruce A. Prenguber, "Transfer of 
Development Rights : An Analysis of a New Land-Use Policy," American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, (Nov. 1975 ), pp. 549-557. 
12Mason, "The Deregulation of Urban Land Markets : A Note on 
Alternatives to Zoning," pp. 54-65. 
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Brubaker13 reviews the issue of increasing conflicts over land use 
and analyzes the possiblity of the conversion of noncropland to cropland 
uses. According to the author, the essential problem is how to 
accommodate changing demands on the land. Land use patterns are influ-
enced by the physical capability of the land, economic demand for parti-
cular land uses, and preferences revealed through public policies. With 
physical capabilities ranking less as a determinant of overall land use, 
potential competition for land among uses is significant and must be 
resolved by economics or by pol icy. This suggests a hierarchy of econo-
mic demands on the land which reflects long-standing price 
relationships. The demand for cropland is one of these demands. To 
determine if cropland needs extra market protection is a question 
depending upon future projections of not domestic demand for agri-
cultural products but on the future foreign demand scenarios and on 
physical yields. 
Furuseth14 reviews and assesses Oregon's agricultural protection 
program, presenting a much broader analysis of agricultural land-use 
controls than Coughlin, et. al ,15 Mason16 and Barrows, et. al.17 
-----13$~~;]j~; Brubaker, "Land--The Far Horizon," American Journa 1 of 
Agricultural Economics (Dec. 1977), pp. 1037-1044. 
14owen J. Furuseth, "The Oregon Agricultural Protection Program: A 
Review and Assessment," Natural Resources Journal 58 (1982) : 236-259. 
15coughl in, "Differential Assessment of Real Property as an Incen-
tive to Open Sapce Preservation and Farmland Retention," p~ 165-179. 
16 Mason, "The Deregulation of Urban Land Markets: A Note on 
Alternatives to Zoning," pp. 54-65. 
1 7Richard L. Barrows and Bruce A. Prenguber, "Transfer of 
Development Rights: An Analysis of a New Land-Use Pol icy," American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics (Nov. 1975), pp. 549-557. 
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Attent i on is focused on, (1) the components of the Oregon farmland 
protection program, (2) the relative success or failure of the program, 
and 0) the unique characteristics or attributes which Oregon is using 
to keep land in agricultural use. 
The Oregon 1 egis 1 ature ca 11 ed on the Land Conservation and 
Development Commission (LCDC) to prepare and enforce a statewide land-
use planning pol icy. On 1 January 1975, the Statewide Planning Goals 
became effective. Two of the planning goals directly related to 
agriculture. One addresses the farmland conversion issue. Embodied in 
this goal is an explicit state policy to protect prime and valuable 
agricultural 1 and from conversion . It is required that all prime or 
valuable agricultural land be inventoried and placed in effective farm 
use (EFU) zones with large lot requirements enacted to discourage 
subdi vision. 
The other called for all municipalities to establish urban growth 
boundaries (UGB) to identify and separate urban 1 and from rura 1 areas. 
Furuseth believes this goal strengthens and complements state policy 
aimed at protecting agricultural 1 ands. He concludes that determining 
if Oregon's public policy action has succeeded in reducing the quantity 
of prime agricultural land converted into urbanization is not possible 
with empirical proof lacking. Lacking empirical evidence, a second test 
suggested to gauge the success of the public policy action is to look at 
the degree of public acceptance and support for the program. With 
sixty-one percent of Oregonians in favor of the voting public policy 
action in the 1978 election, he views Oregon's program as an unqualified 
success. 
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Empirical Research 
As noted in the introduction to the chapter, empirical research 
directed at measuring the effectiveness of agricultural land-use 
controls is lacking. A search of recent literature in the field found 
one empirical work. Furuseth18 updates his earlier work with the 
inclusion of data from The 1978 Census of Agriculture. While an 
empirical model is not specified by the author, one may infer that 
changes in the quantity of farmland are related to the existence of 
agri cu 1 tu ra 1 1 and-use contro 1 s. His contention is that there will be a 
direct relationship between the existence of the controls and changes in 
the quantity of agricultural land. That is, the existence of the 
controls will result in an increase in the quantity of agricultural 
land . 
With direct agricultural land-use controls effectively implemented 
in Oregon in 1974, comparisons are made between changes in the quantity 
of agricultural land before and after 1974. Noting that for the period 
1974-1978 there was an increase in 1 and in farms of 177,809 acres, he 
finds that to be an encouraging indicator that Oregon's agricultural 
land use appears to be undergoing healthy expansion. Furthermore, 
agricultural land-use controls may take at least partial credit for that 
phenomenon. 
Conclusions 
In general, empirical research into the effectiveness of 
-----Is(j:~~-J~-Furuseth, "The Oregon Agricultural Protection Program: A 
Review and Assessment," Natura 1 Resources Journa 1 (J u 1 y 1980 ), pp. 603-
614. 
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agricultural land-use controls is limited to one work in the literature. 
Furuseth's article is a start in the right direction. It is inadequate 
since it fai 1 s to consider other elements that may affect changes in 
agricultural land use. There is a need for an empirical model to 
measure the effectiveness of agri cu ltura 1 1 and use contra 1 s by a 11 owing 
for other elements affecting agricultural land use. Such a model is 
justified to demonstrate the failures or successes of the controls and 
to discuss the corresponding costs or benefits they impose on society. 
Chapter IV establishes a theoretical foundation from which an empirical 
model is developed in Chapter V. 
CHAPT£R IV 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
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The groundwork for understanding the dynamic forces for 
agricultural land-use change has been outlined. It will be helpful to 
construct basic decision models to bring the issues into focus. The 
decision models are necessary to illustrate the economic reactions of 
consumers and producers (farmers) to changes in chosen variables that 
may, either directly or indirectly, affect the demand for land in 
agricultural or other uses. The models are a necessary theoretical 
foundation for the empirical analysis in Chapter V. It is assumed that 
consumers wil 1 seek to ma ximize their utility or satisfaction, and 
producers will seek to maximize profits. The models are 1 imited to two 
sectors, agriculture and nonagriculture. 
Consumer Model 
The following notation is defined for the individual consumer: 
(1) income constraint 
(2) x1 commodity one 
(3) x2 =commodity two 
(4) P1 =market determined price for x1 
(5) P2 =market determined price for x2 
(6) U =the consumer's utility function . 
The consumer is assumed to have a direct utility function that is 
~8 
"well-behaved." Uti 1 ity is a function of the consumption of commodities 
(4 . 1) 
The consumer will maximize utility subject to the budget constraint 
p1 X1 + P2X2 = I. (4.2) 
Mathematically, the Lagrangian (L) expression formed is 
with A an as yet undetermined multiplier. The first order conditions 
are 
aL 
= u1 (x1 , x2 ) - A P1 = o ax1 
aL 
= U2 (X 1 , X2 ) - :\P2 = 0 ax2 
aL 
= I - P1X1 - P2X2 = 0. d1T 
The equilibrium conditions are 
(4.4) 
(4.5) 
That is, the ratio of the marginal utilities for commodities x1 and x2 
must equa 1 the commodity price ratio. The first two equations of (4.4) 
may be written as 
Marginal utility per dollar spent must be the same for each commodity x1 
and x2• Aggregating this model wi 11 result in a national consumer 
economic decision model. 
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The Producer Model 
The following notation is defined for the producer : 
(1 J Pj = market determined (i.e., exogenous J prices for crops 
j = 1, ... , n. 
(2) Yi =inputs to crop production for inputs 1, 2, 3. 
with Y1 = capital input 
y2 labor input 
y3 1 and input 
(3) ri input prices for Yi. 
(4) qj =crop production function for j 1, . • n. 
such that qj = q(Y1, Y2, Y3J. 
(5 J rr = profits 
(6) C =total cost of production. 
The producer is interested in maximizing profits. Profits are 
defined as the difference between the total revenue (TR J received for 
agricultural output, 
n 
TR = j h { p j qj (Y 1' y 2 y 3 ) } ' 
and the total cost (C) incurred in producing that output, 
3 
C = i ~ 1 riYi. 
Profit maximization is, therefore, 
n 3 (MAX) rr = j ~1 { Pj qj(Y1, Y2, Y3J l - i ~ 1 riYi. 
The first-order conditions are 
(4.6) 
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all 
- = pf2 r 2 0 
av2 
(4 . 7) 
all 
- = pf3 - r 3 = 0. 
av3 
The equilibrium conditions are 
pf1 r1 
pf2 r2 (4.8) 
pf3 = r3. 
In equilibrium, the value of the marginal product must equal the factor 
input price for efficient production. As before, summing these results 
yields a national aggregation model. 
Implications 
These models can explain current economic trends in the land 
market. Figure 4.1(a) and 4.1(b) illustrate the conditions that existed 
for the agriculture and nonagriculture sectors in the period 1909-1914. 
To illustrate a point, it is assumed that the nonagricultural sector in 
Figure 4.1(b) is represented by housing. Since that period, per capita 
income, has grown steadily. An economy with increasing per capita 
incomes requires agriculture to undergo continuous change and 
adjustment. This is reflected in the income elasticity of demand for 
food. For example, assume for the consumer, commodity x1 is food and 
commodity x2 is housing. Assume the consumer allocates a twenty percent 
share (K 1 = 0.20) of income for food. Thus, the share of income being 
spent on X2 is eighty percent (K2 = 0.80 = 1 - K1l· If the income 
elasticity of demand for food (n1 l equals 0.16 (a realistic assumption 
for industr i alized countri e s like the United States), the income 
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elast icity of demand for hou sing (n2 ) mu st be 1.2119 
With the income elasticity of demand for food greater than zero, an 
increase in per capita income wil 1 result in an increase In the amount 
of food demanded, assuming co nsta nt pri ces. With n2 > n1 and with 
increasing per capita real income over time the demand for food wi 11 
increase less than proportionately to the increase in demand for 
housing. 20 This changing situation over time is shown in Figure 4.2, 
where the demand for housing has increased relative to that for food 
since the outward shift in the housing demand curve over time from 
DH1909-1914 to oH1983 in panel (b) is relatively larger than the outward 
shift in the food demand curve from oF1909-1914 to oF1983 in panel (a). 
This implies a declining relative demand for food. Agriculture must 
decline relatively because the demand growth for its output is slower 
than for the output of the rest of the economy.21 Agriculture must 
undergo continuous change and adjustment. 
As real income rises, the relative shares will change (depending 
upon the income elasticities of demand) such that the rate of change of 
housing's expenditure share is positive while the rate of change of 
food 's expenditure share is negative. Furthermore, as real incomes 
rise, n1 may decrease. This phenomenon has been observed and discussed 
by D. Gale Johnson (1973).22 
E<rhis must be so for the identity, K1n1 + K2n2 = 1, to hold. 
20with the demand curves for housing and food derived from utility 
maximizing behavior, four properties must be satisfied; 1) additivity, 
2) negativity, 3) symmetry, and 4) homogeneity. 
21 D. Gale Johnson, World Agricultural i n Disarray, (Bungay, 
Suffolk, England: Richard ~The Chaucer PresS} Ltd., 1973), p. 89. 
22tbid., pp. 91-92. 
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With rising incomes, consumers may desire greater land area with a 
home to ma xi mize their ut i lity . Agric ultural land resources are 
s trained since the demand for land in hou s ing uses will increase 
relative to the demand for land in agricultural uses. Wi th a higher 
relative price for housing as compared to food in Figure 4.2, (PH'/PF' > 
PH/PF) land resources are shifted from agricultural use to housing to 
capitalize on the relative price differential existing (PH'- PF'). The 
consumer 's new optimal commodity combination requires a shift in land 
usage to satisfy the higher relative demand for housing. 
Population change is another primary var i able affecting the demand 
growth for food. However, In no case can the popu 1 ati on growth effect 
outweigh the effect of an Income e 1 asti city of demand for food of 1 ess 
than unity on the growth of food demand rei ati veto demand growth for 
housing. If relative prices are constant, the growth in demand for any 
commodity or service can be depicted as follows: D = e Y + P, where D, 
Y, and Pare growth rates of quantity demanded, per capita income and 
population, respectively, and e is the income elasticity of demand for a 
particular commodity or group of commodities.23 If the income 
elasticity of demand of food is 0.16(e), Y is three percent and P is one 
percent, D for food is 1.48 percent. With Y equal to three percent, and 
the income elasticity of demand of housing equal to 1.21, D will be 4.63 
percent. Even with a P of one percent, D for housing is relatively and 
absolutely larger than D for food. 
Expectations may be incorporated Into the ana 1 ysi s. If consumers 
expect current housing market prices to be substantially lower than 
-----23j~h~;~~~ World Agriculture ~Disarray, p. 94. 
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future prices, consumers will react by shifting today's demand curve for 
housing to the right relative to the future demand curve fo r housing. 
Figure 4.2 may be changed to illustrate another point. In Figure 
4.3(a) and 4.3(b) are shown supply curve shifts for housing and food. 
Agricultural output has been greatly expanded over time mainly due to 
productivity gains and technological advances. Assume that cost savings 
in agriculture have exceeded cost savings in housing (in relative 
terms). This implies the supply curve for agriculture (food) shifts 
further to the right than the supply curve for housing. A lower price 
for food of pF1 983 will result. The price differential (pH1 983 -
PF1983 is greater than the price differential (pH1983 - pF1983) before 
the supply curve shifts. Observing this situation, producers waul d 
convert land to capitalize on the greater price differential existing to 
maximize proffts. With the supply of land fixed at any one point in 
time and a rising demand curve for land devoted to housing use, a higher 
price must result. These higher 1 and input prices will be incorporated 
by the producer since, depending upon the particular location involved, 
assessed property taxes rise to reflect the higher 1 and market va 1 ues 
(assuming that no differential assessment program is in existence for 
agricultural land). 
Labor inputs in agricultural production have been declining over 
time due to their relatively higher cost. Observation of condition (4. 
8) re vea 1 s that, with the price of output constant (p) and with r 3 
rising, the producer must reallocate resources so as to raise the 
marginal product of land ff3 ~ To accomplish this, land inputs should 
trend downward. With declining relative land inputs, and declining labor 
inputs, cap i tal inputs must increase to compensate for these effects . 
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Through the decision models developed earlier and the manipulation 
of demand and supply curves, the conclusion reached is that current 
economic conditions are dictating a reallocation of land among the land 
uses. What remains is to structure an empirical model to isolate the 
variables significantly responsible for land use changes. 
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CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
The literature review of Chapter III revealed the inadequate amount 
of attention devoted to the question of the effectiveness of state and 
county agricultural 1 and-use controls. Lacking has been an overall 
national empirical investigation. Chapter IV employed a simplified 
decision model to describe possible consumer and producer economic 
reactions to changes in chosen variables that may affect land-use 
demand. With this theoretical foundation developed, the purpose of this 
chapter is to structure a model to test the effectiveness question. To 
accomplish this, two approaches will be undertaken. 
In the first approach, comparisons of land-use trends are made for 
states and counties grouped on a "with" and "without" 1 and-use control 
basis. These comparisons will be indicative, but are lacking for they 
fail to consider other forces that may be influencing land-use change. 
In the second approach, multiple regression techniques are used to test 
the effectiveness question while adjusting for other forces that may 
affect land-use trends. 
Re 1 evant state and county government agencies in the forty-eight 
continental United States and sixty randomly selected counties were 
surveyed to ascertain the initial dates of legislation (if any) passed 
regulating or influencing agricultural land use.24 Thirty-nine state 
24see Chapter II for an outline of the legislation. 
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and twenty-seven county responses were received. Aggregate data on 
total farmland, total cropland, and harvested cropland were analyzed 
(irrigated harvested cropland was excluded since data was not 
consistenly available at the county level). For the first approach, 
state periods examined are 1969-1974, 1974-1978, and 1969-1978. County 
periods examined are more extensive since the majority of early 
1 egis 1 ati on adopted has been at the county 1 eve 1. The county periods 
examined are 1959-1964, 1964-1969, 1969-1974, 1974-1978, and 1959-1978. 
Multiple Regression Model 
The model to be estimated relates changes .!..!!_agricultural 1 and to 
the fo 1 1 owing set of hypothesi zed exp 1 ana tory vari ab 1 es; (1) changes in 
.. population, (2) changes in nonagricultural income, (3) changes in net 
farm income (after inventory adjustment), (4) changes in government 
payments, (5) a land-use control dummy variable, and (6) the ratio of 
agricultural land to total land. State and county data will be analyzed 
for the periods 1969-1974, 1974-1978, and 1969-1978. An explanation of 
why each hypothesized explanatory variable was included, along with its 
hypothesized sign, follows. 
Population growth has been identified as one of the primary threats 
to the maintenance of the nation's agricultural 1 and base. Growth of 
urban areas necessarily means expansion onto land adjacent to the urban 
area (or land at the urban fringe). This may occur at varying rates 
depending upon the existing development density in the urban area and on 
the desired development density in the areas to be expanded into. 
Sometimes, this expansion of urban activity results in the conversion of 
so called "prime" farmland, although, the actual extent of this has 
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probably been overstated. The coefficient on this variable should have 
a negative sign, implying an inverse relationship between population 
growth and changes in the quantity of agricultural land. 
Higher nonagricultural incomes should result in an increase in the 
demand for land in nonfarm uses. With a low income elasticity of demand 
for agricultural products as compared to the income elasticity of demand 
for housing, the demand for 1 and for farm use is expected to be 
negatively effected by changes in nonagricultural income because changes 
in population growth and changes in nonagricultural income may be 
highly correlated. Several variants of the regression model are 
estimated to deal with the possible correlation. Two equations include 
both variables while the other two use only one at a time. At the 
county 1 evel, one includes both variables whi 1 e the other two use only 
one at a time. 
Changes in net farm income are included for as net farm income 
rises the most likely result is an increase in the demand for land in 
farm use. This would be especially true if farmers believe that there 
will be continual future increases in income. Therefore, changes in net 
farm income should be positively related to changes in the demand for 
land in agricultural use. 
Changes in government payments to farmers should result in an 
increase in aggregate demand for farmland. There may be some validity 
to excluding the variable since it already has been incorporated in net 
farm income. However, with respect to the extent that such payments 
were made to keep land out of production, its inclusion is justified and 
may have a negative effect on the level of harvested croplan~ 
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A dummy variable for state and county control on agricultural use 
is assigned the value of "1" for observations where such controls were 
in effect and "0" otherwise. The hypothesized sign is positive, 
implying that if effective, the controls should have a positive effect 
on changes in agricultural land. In other words, land losses should be 
smaller or land gains larger for states or counties with controls than 
for those states or counties without controls. 
The ratio of agricultural land to total land is included to capture 
the potential for farmland expansion. Other things equal, the lower the 
ratio the easier it should be to expand the farmland base, and vice 
versa. A negative sign on the estimated coefficient is hypothesized. 
Exclusion of Relevant Variables 
With the hypothesized multiple regression model specified, the 
problem of possible relevant variable exclusion exists. If relevant 
variables have been excluded, the results obtained are not as good as 
they could be. If too many variables are included, a higher coefficient 
of determination may be gained at the expense of inferior additional 
explanatory variables, weakening the model's overall justification. 
What follows is a brief discussion of why three possible relevant 
vari ab 1 es were exc 1 uded. 
One possible relevant explanatory variable would be land 
productivity. As land productivity increases (in agricultural terms), 
output per unit of 1 and wil 1 increase. This wil 1 be capita 1 i zed into 
higher land values if left in agricultural production. Increases in 
productivity would lead to an increase in the demand for land in farm 
use. Howe ver, a data weakness for productivity is that it is measured 
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i n inde x form nationally and not at the s tate or county level . With 
respect to the model, any land productivity measure would be a constant 
serving no real purpose. To be truly use ful , productivity figures must 
be available in a state index figure and a county index figure. 
The ratio of the change in agricultural product prices to changes 
in a general price index, such as the GNP deflator, would be relevant if 
di vidsibl e at the state and county 1 evel . With agricul utral prices 
increasing relative to changes in the GNP deflator, an increase in the 
demand for land in farm use would be expected. Farmers would be gaining 
in real terms (assuming they can sell all their output at the prevailing 
pricesL Since the price ratio is essentially the same nationally, it 
would be a constant. 
The last possible relevant explanatory variable is interest rates. 
Lower interest rates for farmers would result in an increase in the 
demand for land in farm use. With other things equal, if a farmer is 
faced with the decision of expanding his acreage base, 1 ower interest 
rates will reduce his payments. However, since interest rates vary only 
slightly, it would be a constant i f included in the regression. 
One ca n no doubt think of other possible variables that may be 
included. However, inadequate justifications and data collection 
problems eliminate them from consideration. With the model specified, 
regression results are prese nted and analyzed in Chapter VI . 
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CHAPTER VI 
RESULTS 
Chapter IV established, using decision models for the consumer and 
producer and demand-supply curve analysis, a theoretical foundation from 
which to structure an empirical model. Chapter V presented the 
empi rica 1 mode 1 in two approaches. In the first, agri cultura 1 1 and-use 
control effectiveness was tested by measuring land-use trends for states 
and counties grouped on a "with" and "without" 1 and-use control basis. 
The hypothesis tested is that the mean percent change in the quantity of 
agricultural 1 and for the "with" control group is greater than the mean 
percent change for the "without" group, i.e., that agricultural 1 and-use 
controls are effective. In the second, changes in the quantity of 
agricultural land were hypothesized to be a function of several 
explanatory variables stuctured in a multiple regression model. Tables 
3, 4, and 5 summarize the results from the first approach. Tables 5 
through 12 summarize the results from the multiple regression model . 
First Approach 
State Results 
In Table 3, there are nine relevant state comparisons made for the 
three time periods and for the three land categories .25 The aggregate 
----25(:]-e-;;;~, total cropland is probably the most important of the 
three categories. 
TABlE 3 
<n!PARISOO OF A<nm::ATE AND AVEliAGE ~ IN FARMLAND BY TYPE AND STATE WI'll! 
AND WITOOur LAIID-lliE a:wma..s; 1969-74, 1974-78, AND 1969-78 (ACREAGE in 1000'S) 
1969-1974a 1974-:_19J011" 1969-1976c 
----rro- rro- rro-
cantrors Controls Controls Controls Controls Controls 
Total far•land 
Acroago--lnltlol yoar I.H,7.B 771,695 167,939 705,4.}.} 1.H,7.ll 771,695 
Acreago-tormlnal yoar l.l2,0l7 741,H5 168,474 714, .)75 lll,004 749,845 
Chango -5,G96 -JO ,.l60 5l5 8,942 4,729 -21,850 
Porcentage change -4.14 -.l .9.l O.l2 1, 27 .l.4.l -2.8l 
-----... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aver ago percentage chonga -5.91 -6.96 2.07 3.67 -l.59 -}.88 
Standard deviation 4.40 5.79 .) . 16 5.56 }.47 5.00 
•t• statistic 0.55 -1.07 0.18 
Total Croplondb 
Acreogo--lnlthll year 64,501 }29,67} 71,774 }()6,5:n 64,501 J29,87.l 
Acreago-tor•lnal year 61,261 }17,050 75,047 }19, 751 64,}44 .}30,454 
Change -},240 -12,82} },27} 1} , 214 -157 581 
Percentage change -5.02 -J.89 4.56 4.31 -0.24 6.18 
---·---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Average percentage change -4.59 -5.04 7.99 7.66 J.92 1.96 
Standard deviation 1.97 .}.48 6.59 5.84 7.46 4. 74 
•t• statistic 0.9J o. 13 0.66 
llarvos tod Crop land 
Acreoge--lnltlol year .}6,460 198,756 48,208 207,995 .}8,460 198,758 
Acreage-terminal year 42,251 21},952 49,320 226,045 43,440 231,925 
Change },791 15,194 1,112 18,050 4,980 33,167 
Percontago change 9.86 7.64 2.ll 8.68 12.95 16.69 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------7,12 
4.24 
7, 70 
7.43 
Average percontoge change 
Standard deviation 
•t• statistic 
-o,}} 
7,04 
7.88 
-o,54 
8. 70 
7.12 
15,69 
4. 7l 
-o.49 
16,75 
6. 72 
aln 1969, of tho thirty-nine states surveyed, there wore seven states vlth contro ls on tho use of agricultural land. 
bin 1974, of the thirty-nine stetu surveyed, there were eight with controls on tho uso of agricultural land. 
<:eased on the uven stetes with controls In 1969. 
... 
... 
TABLE 4 
a:NPARISOO OF A(X;RffiATE AND AVERAGE CHANGrn IN FARMLAND BY TYPE AND <XXJNI'Y Wl'lli 
AND W!THQ(1J' LAND--USE mtmlOLS ; 1969--74, 1974-78, AND 1969--78 (AffiEAGE IN 1000'S) 
1969-.19H a 1974-1 978° 1969-1978c 
---- ,:o- ~ro-- -,;a--
Contro ls Cont ro l s Contro l s Cont•·o l s Cont ro ls Controls 
Total far•lend 
Acreago-lnltlal yuM 5.164 7 ,42} 6,106 },696 5, 164 7 ,42} 
Acreago-tunnlnal yoer 4 , 695 7,109 6,500 },666 5, 1}9 7,227 
Change -269 -}14 }92 -}0 -25 -196 
Percenhgtt change -5.21 -4.2} 4. 8}47 -o.17 -{).46 -2.64 
Averago porcentage change 
-•. 55 -6.04 2. 77 -1.27 -2.}6 -5.61 
Stondar d deviation 5.91 7,}1 8.41 6,55 11.64 11 . 14 
"t" statistic o. 57 0,52 0 , 74 
Total Croplandb 
Acreage--In It tal year },174 4,69} 5,111 2,459 }, 174 4,69} 
Acreage-tenalnal year },056 4,512 5,495 2, 510 },256 4. 749 
Change -116 -181 }64 51 62 56 
Percentege change -}.65 -},66 7,51 2,07 2.56 1.19 
Average percentage change -4.86 -5.74 5. 52 2,50 -o.04} -2 . }6 
Standard deviation 6.69 6,25 7. 76 5,56 9,24 9,67 
•t• statistic 0.}27} 
'· 16 0,601 
t&orves tod Crop I and 
Acreage-Initial year I, 794 },25} },969 1,91} 1,794 },25} 
Acreage-tert~~lnal year 2,00 }, 752 4, 209 1,975 2, 256 },926 
Change }}6 499 240 62 464 67} 
Percentage change 16 . H 15,}4 6 , 05 },24 25,66 20,69 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average percentage change 
Standard dovlotlon 
"t" statistic 
18.69 12.14 
10.6 16.5 
1.2486 
}. 54 
9. 5 
-0.76 
6,27 
9.06 
24.4 
8.85 
1,16 
0 1n 1969, of the twdnty-seven counties surveyed, there w• re nine counties with controls on tho use of 
•grlcultunl land. 
bin 1974, of tho twttnty-soven counties surveyed, there were fourteo n counties with controls on the usa of 
~rlcul tun I land. 
'nasad on the nine counties with controls In 1969. 
17,}1 
22.01 
-"' 
<.n 
TABLE 5 
<XIIPARISJN OF AGGRffiATE AND AVERAGE CHANGES IN FARMLAND BY TYPE AND <X>Um'Y Willi 
AND WITIIOlff lAND-USE CXNI'IlOL.'i; 1959--M, 1~, AND 1959--78. (ACREAGE IN 1000'S ) 
I IJ:i'J -1 1)(.4'1 
___ .:..:.;..:_..:.;_-no- 1964 - I 961} 1 ---=..:....=~~ro--­
Controls Con trols 
1959-1978c 
__ __:..:.;.::....:..:..:c: < ro-
Cont ro ls Contro ls 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Con trols Con tro ls 
Total for•lond 
Aerugo-InItIo I yoar },605 9,414 4,498 e. 571 } , 605 9 , 414 Acroago-to>rmlnal yollr 
'· 754 9,}15 4, 526 8 , 061 l, 950 8 , 416 Chango 1<9 
- 99 28 
-510 }45 
-998 Porcontage chllnt:Jt.l 4.1.) 
-1.05 0.62 
-5 , 95 9, 57 
-10 , 60 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------·------
.t.verage percentage chana• I, 19 
-4.14 -{),57 
-9.28 5,67 
-16,95 Standard deviation 7, 5l 10 , 87 6,98 10 . 57 15,}9 21 , }0 
"t• statistic 1.45} 1 2.46 11 2.74) ... 
Total Croplandb 
Acroago-1 n If I a I yoar 2,28} 5 , 501 2,50} 5, 204 2, 28} 5, 50 1 Acreage-terminal yoor 2,270 5,4}7 2,684 5 , 18} 2, 575 5,438 Change 
-I} 
-64 181 
-21 292 
-71 Percentage chango ..{).51 
-1.16 7.2} 
-o.40 12,79 
-1.29 
--------------·--------------------·---------------------------------------------------
.t.verage percentage change 
-0.18 
-4.04 5,61 
-I. 15 14.45 -1.86 Standard deviation 6.}4 9.52 12.86 12. 51 8.48 19.45 
•t• statistic 1.101 I, 20 
.).97 ... 
llbrvostod Croplllnd 
Acreage--Initial year 1,416 4,219 1,4H },757 1,416 4,219 Acreage-•ter•lna I year 1,}28 },902 1,511 }, 5}0 I , 748 4,4}6 Change 
-88 
-}11 
" 
-227 }}2 217 Percentage change 
-6.21 
-1.51 2.99 
-6 . 04 2},45 5. 14 
Average percentage change 
Standard deviation 
---------------------------------------------·--------------------------------------------------
-4.04 -12.83 
wr• statistic 
11.06 10.40 
1.107 
-0.54 -10.95 
13.26 11 . }1 
1. 854 .. 
27.27 -8.28 
}2 . 19 21,54 
2.J5} .. 
8
1n 1959, of the twenty-seven counties surveyed, there were five counties with contro ls on the use of 
agricultural land. 
bin 1964, of the twonty-sevon counties surveyed, thore were seven counties with controls on the use of 
agricultural land. 
caaud on the five counties with controls In 1959. 
NOTEz Superscripts •, "• and 1 " lndlcato 5lgnlflconce at the 0 . 10, 0.05, end 0.01 lovels, respectively. 
_,. 
"' 
TABLE 6 
Sl.MoiARY OF ESTIIIATED STATE RFDIDlSION ~ATIONS 
Dependent Verleble: 6Total Fetrmlend 
Independent Ver lllbl es 
!1 NeT Land (; 6 Nonegr I cuI ture I Farm 6 Government Control 
Eq. Per lod Constant Population Income Income Peyments Ounmy 
L11nd 
Retlo R2 
(I) 1969-1974 -6a5.1 
---
-a.a6a• a.a77 1. 522 111 299.2 1746. 5• a.63 11.3''' 
(-1.48) 
---
(-1.86) ( 1.32) (5.35) <a.65) (1.97) 
(2) 1969-1974 -555,6 -I. 522 1 .. 
--
a.1a1 1.439 111 275.a 1459,9• a.69 14.7 ... 
(-1. 57) (-3.24) 
---
( 1,89) (5,61) 1a.69l (1,81) 
(3) 1969-1974 -449.4 -1.357 .. 
-a.a25 a.111 1.384* .. 384.9 131a.5 a. 1a 12. 3''' 
1-1. 18) 1-2.63) 1-a. 79) (2.a1) 15.18) 1a.91) (1.57) 
7;;---i9;;:i9;ii---;;;~;~------:::·----------o~o;;;;-------o:-;~9;;----o~3oii-------:;;;~;;-----:;;;:-;-----o:s;;--·-s:s•• 
15) 1974-1978 
(6) 1974-1978 
<a.26) --- 12.44) 12.21) (1.51) 1-1.77) (-Q.53l 
155.8 
10. 58) 
a.472 
(1,41) 
0.119 .. 
(2.a6) 
a. 266 
(1,22) 
-331.4 
1-1.21) 
-216.8 
(-Q.32) 
68.79 -a.a98 a.a27• a.121 .. a.317 -479.6• -353.a 
1a.27) 1-a.22) (1,93) (2.18) 11.50) 1-1.75) 1-Q.54) 
a. 26 2. 3 ' 
a.34 2.7 .. 
u;-~969:~9;-a---~;;;:;·------:::-----------:o:ooii--------:o:o;------o:ii;;:;-------;9:;;-----=~~;o:8;----o:~3----~: 6•'' 
10.36) --- 1-a.52) (-a.28) 12.a6> 1a.a6) 1-1.96) 
(8) 1969-1978 244.9 -0.967 111 -- a.a91 a. 57a• 99.18 -1401.8** a. so 6.6 ... (a.B4) 1-3. 19) 
--
1 1.49) 1 1.86) 1a.26) 1-2.71) 
(9) 1969-1978 261.1 -0.961 111 -a.aa2 o.a95 0.536 129.3 -1406.1 .. a. 50 5.4 ••• 
(a.83) 1-3.a9> 1-a.16) ( 1,43) ( 1,44) 1a.31) 1-2.68) 
NJTE: "t" stetlstlcs are shown In parentheses below the estlmeted coefficients. Superscripts •, ••, end ••• Indi ca te 
slgnlflclllnce et the 0.10, 0.05, end 0.01 levels, respectively. 
""' ..... 
TABLE 7 
SlldloiARY OF ESTIMATED STATE RmlESSION ~ATIONS 
Dependent V&rleble : l1 Total Cropland 
Independent Yar-lables 
Eq, Period Conshnt 
(1 
Population 
f!.Honagrlculturel 6Fe~~ern-~nt Co~~~~~ 
I nco~n& Income Payrnents Ounmy 
land 
R&tlo R2 
888. Jll o. 73 17.9 ... (11 196~1974 -128,6 
--
-0,000} 0,01} o. 729 111 -162,0 
(-1, 251 
--
t-0,0}1 (0,581 (8,221 t-0.961 (2,47 1 
949.2 11 o. 73 18 . 0 ... 121 1969-1974 -142 .} 0,211 
--
0,009 o. 741 111 -174,} 
(-1,}51 (0,261 
--
10.421 (7. 741 1-1,091 (2,281 
D1 1969-1974 - D8,8 0,07} -o.002 0.010 o. 740 ... -165.4 953.4 .. o. 7} 14.5 11 ' 
1-1 , 271 10,}01 1-0.161 10,441 17.61 1 t-0,971 (2,251 
7~;- --~~;;:-;~;;---·-;;:~ .. -------==-----------~:;;;;:::------;;:~;;:::-----;;:~;Q:::---:;;;~:;::----_7 5 ;:;:-----o:66--T2:61" 
I 5) 1974-1978 
16) 1974-1978 
10,671 -- 15,}71 (},681 (},711 1-2.241 1-1,651 
104.0 
(0. 741 
0.995 ... 
(},961 
0.121 ... 
12.921 
0.240 1 
I I, 79) 
-209,8 
1-1.081 
108,9 
10.201 
66.1 0.250 0.032 11 0.127... 0.377... -39.).511 -570.6 
(0,521 10,751 (},051 (},411 12,951 (-2,141 1-1,071 
0,56 e. s••• 
0,66 to.s••• 
;-;~---~969:~9;s----6;:6--------:::-----------ii:iiii;---------ii:ii~9;-----ii:~;~------:;68:;-------:;~;:~;-----o:~----,:~ .. -
.10.521 -- 10,5}1 (1,741 1-0 , 741 1-1,271 1-2,201 
181 1969-1978 12},1 -o,ll5 
--
0.07-4 11 -o. 2J5 -206,8 -880.6 .. 0,}1 2. 92
11 
(0,981 1-0,651 
--
(2,081 1-1,501 (-1,101 1-2.251 
191 1969-1978 98,} -0,1}1 0.004 0,067• -0,170 -165,9 -889.9 11 0,}2 2.5
11 
10.741 t-o. 121 (0,621 t I, 781 (-0,891 1-1,251 {-2.251 
NOTE: "t" stet I stl cs are shown In perentheses be I ow the est I mated coef f lc Ients. Superscripts •, .. , end ••• Indicate 
significance et the 0.10, 0.05, end 0.01 levels, respectively. 
_, 
OJ 
TABLE 8 
SLUMRY OF ESTUIATED STATE RffiRESSION EXlUATIONS 
Dependent V lSr Ia b I e: lJ. Harvested Crop 1 and 
Independent Var I abIes 
e -~ana 
6 ~Nonagricultural 6 Farm 6 Government Control Land 
2 Eq. Period Constant Population Income Income Payments Ounmy Ratio R 
I,, 196!1-1974 ~~g:b ::: ~~:g~~... ~~:~w·· ~:g:m 2~u3 , 50~;:~;;· o. 78 23. 7· .. 
(2) 1969-1974 ~~6:~71 ~ =~:~!;· ::: ~~:~::· .. l:g:~~: ;~:~,, 42~~:~~;· 0,77 21,9 '" 
OJ 1969-1974 -~g:~4) ~=~::~~ ~=~:g?;:: ~~:~:~· .. l:g:~~~ 2~~:;9) 45~;:~;;· 0.80 20. 8 '" 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------... ---------------------------------14) 1974-1978 26,8 
-- 0.027 111 0.081 1 ... 0,026 -421. 2** 402.8 o. 51 6 . 8 ... 10 , 25) 
--
14,))) 12.50) 10,28) 1-2. 58) 10,88) 
15) 1974-1978 68,4 0,641< 
--
0,075' 
-0 ,075 
-260,0 )077,9' 0,)8 4 .\ 111 10 . 58) 12.89) 
-- 12,02) 1-0. 70) 1-1, 50) 12,0)) 
16) 1974-1978 26.2 0,014 0.027*** 0.080** 0,024 -420.3 .. 414.8 0,51 5.5'" 10.24) 10,05) 12,82) 12,40) 10. 2JJ 1-2 . 52) 10, 77) ;-;~---~~~~=~~;;---:~~:~---------:::-----------:~:~~~---------~:~~;:::---:~:~~~-----:;;~:;-----;;~;:~:::--~:§r---2§:3111 
1-0,4)) -- 1-I,J)) 14,1JI 1-0,471 1-1.021 18,951 
181 1969-1978 49,) - 0 . 595 ... 
-- 0.213*** -o. 176 -360,8 4517.4 ... 0,84 35 . 3··· 10.36) 1-2,84) 
--
15,13) 1-0,95) 1-1,65) 16. 79) 
19) 1969-1978 8 J ,4 
-o. 569** 
-o,006 o. 223*** -0,267 
-276,2 4557.6*** 0.84 29 . 1 ••• 10 . 55) 1-2. 65) 1-0, 75) 15, II J 1-1. 2)) 1-I.IJ J 16. 78) 
NOTE : 11t 11 statisti cs are shown In pllrentheses below the estlml!ted coefficients. Superscripts •, ••, and ••• lndicllte 
signifi cance ~t the 0.10, 0.05, ~nd 0.01 levels, respectively. 
-"· 
"' 
TAB!.£ 9 
S!.MMARY OF ESTIMATED STATE IID:RESSIOO RESULTS 
Excluded Vi!~rll!ble: lJ. Government Payments 
Dependent Variables: .6.Tot!!!l Farml&nd !Equations (1)-()JI; ilTohl Cropland !Equations (4)-(6)1 ; end 6Har vest e d 
Cropland !Equations (7)-(9)1 ' 
Net L&nd (', 6 NoMgrlcultural .6. Farm Control land Eq, Per I od Constllnt Popu I at I on Income Income Dunrny Ro!Stlo R2 
(I) 1969-1974 520,2 
-1.882 
-0.0699 0.0979 846,8 
-1906,2 0,44 5. 24 ••• tl. 181 <-2. 78) 111 (-1.66) .. (1,341' (I, 54 I' (-2.56)*U 
(21 1974-1978 
-110.2 0 , 0282 0,0251 0,112 -446,7 422, I o. 29 2.70 .. (-0,472) !0.064) <1.72>*' ( 1.98)** (- 1.61 ,. (1,07) 
Dl 1969-1978 329.3 -1.076 
-0.0138 0,115 385,8 -1393, I 0,47 5.86 ··· (1,05) (-3.53)* .. (-1.141 {I. 742) .. ( 1.0001 (-2.61 , ... 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------.. -------------------------(41 1969-1974 41,2 
-0.620 
-o,00834 0,0135 95,9 
-1183,9 o. 25 2. 15 (0.23) (-1. 71 , •• (-0.39) (0,351 (0,35) <-2.27)* 1 
(51 1974-1978 10,3 0.693 0,0213 0,111 
-325,7 613,5 o. 57 e. 1a••• (0,0741 (2. II, .. ( 1.95 , •• <2. 71 , ••• (-1.601' (1.57)* 
(61 1969-1978 69,7 
-0.0889 0.00810 0,0592 -344,8 
-868,2 0,30 2 . 8 .. (0, 54) t-0,51) ( 1.34 ,. t 1,62 I' (-1. 79)* 1 <-2.204 , •• 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(7) 1969-1974 -57 . 7 
-o. 360 -0.0364 0.101 191.2 4933.6 o. 79 24. a ••• t-0.42) (-1.191 (-2.047) .. D.23l*** (0,83) (7.96)••• 
(8) 1974-1978 26,1 0,0433 0,0263 0,0791 -415,3 498,8 o. 51 6 . 75 1 .. (0,25) (0. 16) (2.961* .. (2.43)* .. (-2. 54) ••• (1.29 )* 
(9) 1969-1978 34,4 -0,499 
-0.000792 0,210 
-397.9 4627.7 0,84 34. 2··· (0,24) (-2.41 >··· (-0, Ill (4. 93>··· (-1. 75) .. (6.67 , ••• 
NOTE : "t11 stlltlstlcs ~reshown In p~rentheses below the estlm~ted coefficients. Superscr Ipts •, ••, ~nd ••• 
lndlc.,te sign If lcance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
U1 
0 
TABLE 10 
Su.tMARY OF ESI'IWATED REGRESSION ~ATIONS (CXXMrY DATA) 
Dependent V~rl~ble: 6 Tot~l farmland 
Net L~nd 
r:, 6Nonagr leu I tural A F~rm Control L~nd 
R2 Eq. Per lod Constant Popu I at I on Income Income Ourrrny R~tlo 
(I) 1969- l974 
-38.443 
--- 0.0229 -0.626* .. -24.044** 47.72.3 .. 0.59 7.76 ... (-1.8052) 
-- () .1522) (-5.353) (-) .8815) (). 760) 
(2) 1969-1974 
-24 .3 19 o. 10098 
--- -0.605*** -2.3.440** 31.704 0.56 7. 08'' ' (- 1.3272) 10.3739) 
-- (-5.1017) (-1. 788) ( 1.3050) 
(3) 1969-1974 
-37.808 
-0.0467 0.0245 -0.626*** -2.3.999** 47.02.3* 
o. 59 5.94 ••• (-1 .7055) (-0 .15451 ( 1.0732) (-5.2247) (-1.8355) ( ).6731) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(41 1974-1978 
- 23.988 
--- - 0 . 00505 0.8.314* 35.461' 33.940 0.2) I. 50 (-0. 7756) 
--- (-0.3202) (1.5457) ( 1.6044) (0.8054) 
(5) 1974-1978 
-40.409 o. 3762 
-- 0. 7865' 29.5514' 56.1358 0.22 I. 54 (-1. 1706) (0.4535) 
--- ( 1.4824) () .3903) ().2349) 
(6) ) 974-1978 
- 35 .007 0.4996 
-0.00786 0.8253' 33.0217' 47.944 o. 23 1.23 (-0.9464) (0.5646) (-0.4688) () .510)) ().4442) (0.969)) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------·---------------(7) 1969-1978 
- 59.223 
-- 0.00777 -0.1662 
-4.0877 76.0723 0.08 0.45 (-1.1984) 
-- co . 5056) c-0.5766l (-Q.I292l ( 1.1846) 
(8) )969-1978 
-50.8536 o. 1257 
---
-0.16)0 
-3.35)4 66.1670 0.07 0.40 (-1.0450) (0.2722) 
--
(-Q.5443l (-Q.I055l ().0519) 
(9) )969-1978 - 63 .7204 0.08024 0.007204 
-0.1785 -3.8888 81.0701 0.08 0.35 (-1. 11 22 l co. 1667) (0.4480) (-0.5873) (-Q.I201) (I. l228l 
NOTE: 11t 11 st~tlstlcs are shown In p~rentheses below the estlm~ted coefficients. Superscripts •, .. , and ••• lndlc~te slgnlf lcance at the 0.10, 0.05, ~nd 0.01 levels, respective ly . 
~ 
TABLE 11 
Sl.HIARY OF ESTIMATilD REXiR&SSIOO ~ATIOOS (CXXJNfY DATA) 
Dependent Variable: 6 Total CropiMd 
Net Lllnd 
Popu ~lit I on 6. Nonagr 1 cuI tural 6 fllrm Control Land R2 Eq. Per I od Constant Income Income Ounmy Ratio 
(1) 1969-1974 
-8.9419 
--- 0.003579 -0.2511*•• 
-5.7169 8. 5671 0.46 4.69 111 (-1. 1683) --- (0.4124) (-4.2256) (-0.8923) <0. 6849) 
(2) 1969-1974 
-7.0739 0.002752 
--
-0.2486* .. 
-5.9066 6. 2499 0.46 4.62 111 (-0.9990) (0.0217) 
--
(-4.1823) (-0.9201) <0.5193) 
01 1969-1974 
-8.6263 
- 0.0374 0.0050 -o. 2509••• 
-5.7185 e. 1483 0.46 3.61 .. (-1.0877) (-0. 2418) (0.4699) (-4. 1327) (-0 .8732) <0.6316) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------............ (41 1974-1978 7.8155 
-- -0.00663 -o. 4466* 24.3635 11 
-5.2736 0.29 2 • .30* <0.6448) 
--
(-0.90461 (-1.6067) (2. 16641 <-o. 24551 
(5) 1974-1978 3.00198 0.009474 
---
-o. 4862** 20.63.30) .. 4. 0265 
o. 27 2.02 <0. 2200) <0.0241) 
--
(-1. 7163) (1.8551) (0.1704) 
(6) 1974-1978 4. 9561 0.2042 
- 0.008345 -o. 4469 1 23.7112 .. 
-o. 5999 0.30 1.82 <0. 3595) <0.4656) (-1.0027) (-1. 5718) (2.0552) <-D.0249) 
-------------------------------------------------------... -----------------------------------------------------(7) 1969-1978 
-3.6342 
-- -0.001665 0.08816 3. 5167 15. 1468 0.05 0.30 (-0.2289) --- <-D.2779) (0.69) <O. 2553 I (0.5694) 
(8) 1969-1978 
-1.3763 
-0.0938 
---
0.09737 2.9579 12.3041 0.06 0.35 1-0.0860) 1-0.5098) 
--- <0.7545) <0.2147) <0. 4619) 
191 1969-1976 -0.8143 -0.08674 
-0 . 0006077 0.09787 2. 9089 11.5799 0.05 0.27 1-0.0466) 1- 0.4269) I-D.0923J 10. 7404) 10.2062) 10.4082) 
NOTE: 
"t" stati s tics are shown In parentheses below the estimated coefficients. SuperscrIpts •, ••, ond ••• 
lndlcote significance at the 0 . 10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectlvely. 
<n 
N 
TABLE 12 
SLMMARY OF ESTIMATED REXJRE:sSIOO EJQUATIOOS (CUJNI'Y DATA) 
Dependent V~rlable: 6 Harvested Crop land 
A Nonagr 1 cuI tun~ I 6 f~~: Land !::. Control Land R2 Eq. Per I od Constant Population Income Income Dumny Ratio 
111 1969-1974 -11.1787 
-- -0.003J07 0 • .39505 111 B. 2337 111.1787111 1 0.65 10.15111 1-1.01241 
--- 1-0.25311 14.26701 10.83681 14.21031 
121 1969-1974 -8.7052 -o. 1575 
--
0 • .396.3 111 7. 7681 107.1840 ... 0.66 10.6''' 1-0.85791 1-0.83221 
--
14.38281 10.80541 14.23871 
D1 1969-1974 - 9.8645 -0.1939 0 .004304 0 • .3958''' 8.0605 109. 1083 0.66 B.D**' 1-0 . 81951 10 .26721 14.24331 10.81291 14.06771 
141 1974-1978 12.256 --- -0.007801 -o.2269 15. 1499' -18.0548 0.19 1.28 I 1.29061 
--
1-1.29811 1-0.95451 !1.6030 1 1-0.90221 
151 1974-1978 12.0168 -0.2472 
--
-0.2619 12.8338' -16.2951 o. 15 o. 97 I 1. 14031 1-0.77641 
--
1-1.08671 (1.3650 1 1-0.74991 
161 1974-1978 12.990 -0.06458 -0 .007189 -0.22762 15. 2881' -19.4478 0.19 o. 98 ( ( .22911 (-0. 17691 (-1.0190 1 (-0.93591 !1.57641 1-0.88681 
-------------------------------------------------------------------... --------------------------------------·-------
!11 196<}-1978 6. 5491 
--
-0.005273 0.4449 11 9.8434 93.817 .. 0.34 2.86 .. 10.31561 
--
(-0.64251 12.48951 10.51761 !1.83861 
(81 196<}-1978 9. 5155 -0 .2207 
---
0.4649 111 8.4385 88. 7093 .. 0.35 2.99 .. (0.45711 1-0.87961 
---
12.57821 (0.44391 ( 1. 74481 
191 196<}-1978 11.787 -0.1853 -0.00284 0.4681 111 7. 9548 84.6475' 0.36 2.32' (0.52481 1-0.66161 1-0.31301 (2.53841 10.40841 (1. 58171 
NOTE: 11t 11 statistics are shown In parentheses below the estimated coefficients. Superscripts •, ••, and ••• 
Indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
<.n 
w 
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data abov e the dashed line in each part of the table i s le ss meaningful 
becua se of the considerable differen ces in the size of agricultural 
ar eas amo ng t he states. The key data r eported is the average percent 
change for the states in each category. This is shown below the dashed 
1 ine in each part of the table, as are the standard deviations and "t" 
statistics for testing for significant differences between the "with" 
control and "without" control means. 
Examining the "t" statistics reveals that four of the differences 
have the wrong sign under the null hypothesis. None of the differences 
are signifi cant at either the 0.10, 0.05, or 0.01 probability levels. 
Only one comparison is marginally significant and that is the comparison 
for total farmland during the 1974-1978 period. The mean percent change 
for the "with" control group is 1.07 standard deviations below the mean 
percent change for the "without" control group . This difference is 
significant at the 0.15 l e vel, but the si gn does not agree with the 
hypothesized sign. The evidence presented in Table 3 is, at best, mi xed 
concerning the effectiveness of state agricultural land-use controls. 
County Results 
In Table 4 and Table 5, there are nine relevant compa r isons made 
for the three time periods and for the three land categories. Table 4 
analyzes county agricultural 1 and-use control effectiveness 
corresponding to the time periods of Table 3. One "t" statistic has the 
wrong sign . This is for ha r vested cropland for the 1974-1978 period. 
The results of Table 4 are more meaningful than the results of Table 3 
because Table 3 does not consider the possiblity that while a state may 
not hav e cont r ol legislati on, county or othe r local government units 
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might. Such local laws may be affecting land resource allocation, but 
they are not being accounted for at the state level . 
Table 5 presents data for three additional time periods not 
available at the state level. In contrast to Table 3 and Table 4, all 
of the "t" statistics have the correct sign under the null hypothesis. 
Two of the differences are significant at the 0.01 level. These are for 
total farmland and total cropland for the 1959-1978 period. Three of 
the differences are significant at the 0.05 level. These are for 
harvested cropland for the 1959-1978 period and for total farmland and 
harvested cropland for the 1964-1969 peiod. One difference is 
significant at the 0.10 level. This is for total farmland during the 
1959-1964 period. Of greater importance is that in each category and 
time period the average positive percent change in the quantity of 
agricultural land for the "with" control group exceeds that of the 
"without" control group. Furthermore, the average negative percent 
change for the "with" control group is 1 ess than that of the "without" 
control group. With six of nine "t" statistics significant at a minimum 
probability level of 0.10 and favorable average percent changes in the 
quantity of agricultural land for the "with" control group, agricultural 
1 and-use controls appear, for the most part, to be effective for the 
time periods specified. However, when 1 coking at a 1 ong time period 
(1959-1978), structural changes, such as those taking place in 
agriculture in the 1970's, may go unnoticed. To capture the structural 
changes, subperiods are analyzed. While statistically of greater 
importance, Table 5 is less meaningful than Table 3 or Table 4 since the 
time periods analyzed do not all ow for structural change. 
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To relate changes in the quantity of agri cultural land solely to 
the existence of agricultural land-use controls is lack i ng since other 
factors may come into play. Chapter V outlined a multiple regression 
model to describe changes in the quantity of agricultural 1 and as a 
function of severa 1 hypothesi zed exp 1 ana tory vari ab 1 es. Results from 
that model are discussed below. 
Multiple Regression Results 
State Results 
The first approach explained changes in the quantity of total 
farmland, total cropland, and total harvested cropland as a function of 
the existence of agricultural 1 and-use controls. This approach was 
limited for it failed to consider other variables possibly influencing 
agricultural 1 and use. Results from the multiple regression model are 
summarized in Tables 6 through 12. State regression results are 
sullJTiarized in Tables 6 through 9, while county regression results are 
summarized in Table 10 through 12. Results pertaining to total cropland 
are discussed for they are more important to the controversy surrounding 
agricultural land conversion and land-use controls than total farmland 
or harvested crop 1 and (si nee the major extent of concern surrounding 
agricultural land is centered on losses from the cropland base~ 
Table 7 summarizes state regression results where the dependent 
variable is the change in total cropland. Equations (1) through (3) 
analyze data for the period 1969-1974 . In equation (1), changes in 
population is excluded as a possible explanatory variable due to 
possible multicollinearity with nonagricultural income. The "t" 
statistics for changes in nonagricultural income, changes in net farm 
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income, and the land-control dummy variable were not statistically 
significant. The estimated coefficient on changes in nonagricultural 
income (-0.0003) implies that for every one mill ion dollar increase or 
decrease in nonagricultural income, total cropland will decrease or 
increase by 0.3 acres. The estimated coefficient on net farm income 
says that for every one million dollar increase in net farm income, 
total cropland will increase by thirteen acres. 
The "t" statistics for government payments and the 1 and ratio are 
significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. The estimated 
coefficient on government payments and the land ratio imp l i es that for 
every one million dollar increase in government payments or a change in 
the 1 and ratio of one-tenth of one percent, tota 1 farmland wi 11 increase 
by seven hundred and twenty-nine acres or 888.7 acres, respectively. In 
equation (2 ), the results are not significant 1 y changed by inc 1 udi ng 
changes in population and excluding changes in nonagricultural income as 
an explanatory variable. The estimated coefficient for changes in 
population implies that for every one thousand increase in population, 
total crop l and will increase by two hundred and eleven acres. This is 
opposite to the hypothesized sign on the estimated coefficient. With 
changes in population and changes in nonagricultural income included in 
Equation (3), again the results are not significant l y different. For 
the period 1969-1974, changes in government payments and the land ratio 
statistically best explain changes in the quantity of total cropland. 
Different results are obtained for the 1974-1978 pe r iod. With 
changes in population excluded in equation (4), changes in 
nonagricultural income, changes in net farm income, changes in 
government payments, the land-use control dummy, and the land ratio are 
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statistica lly sig nif ica nt at the 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.05 , and 0.10 
levels, respectively. The signs on changes in nonagricultural i ncome 
and the l and-use control dummy are wrong under the hypothesis. The 
es timated coefficient for changes in nonagricultural income suggest that 
for every one mi 11 ion dollar increase in nonagricultural income, total 
cropland will increase by thirty-eight acres. Equation (5) excludes 
changes in nonagricultural income and includes changes in population as 
an explanatory variable. The sign on changes in population does not 
agree with the hypothesized sign, implying that for every one thousand 
increase in population, total cropland wi 11 increase by 995 acres. 
Changes in population and changes in nonagricultural income are included 
as explanatory variables in Equation (6). For the two periods 1969-1974 
and 1974-1978, the percentage of total variation in the dependent 
vari ab 1 e exp 1 a i ned by the independent v ari ab 1 es (R-square) ranges from 
0.56 to 0.73 and the related F statistics are all significant a t the 
0.01 or 1 ower probabi 1 i ty 1 eve 1 s. 
The equations for the 1969-1978 period explain much less (the 
va 1 ues of R-square range form 0.30 to 0.32 ). Presumab 1 y, the structura 1 
changes that occurred in agriculture in the early 1970's result in poor 
statistical results when estimating equations for the entire period. 
Fortunate 1 y, the dates of the Census of Agri cu 1 ture correspond rough 1 y 
with th is structural change. The use of the periods 1969-1974 and 1974-
1978 di c tated by the avai 1 abi 1 i ty of data make some sense given the 
changes that occurred about 1973-1974. 
The coefficients on the land-use control dummy variable are 
consistently negative and are statistically significant only in 
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equations (4) and (6) for the 1974-19 78 periodJ6 Using the se point 
estimates as the best available, one could infer that in the "typical" 
state, the existence of land-use controls resulted in a reduction in the 
cropland base of some 160-175 thousand acres during the 1969-1974 period 
and 200-410 thousand acres during the 1974-1978 period. Of couse, this 
is inconsistent with the hypothesis. The explanation for this may be 
that the mode 1 is mi sspeci fi ed. Rather than 1 and-use contra 1 s affecting 
the rate of 1 and conversion, the reverse may be true. The following 
county regression results may provide additional insights . 
County Resu 1 ts 
Tab 1 e 11 sunmari zes county regression results where the dependent 
variable is the change in total cropland. For the 1969-1974 period, the 
only "t" statistic of significance is for changes in net farm income at 
the 0.01 probabi 1 ity 1 evel. For equations (1) and (3 ), the sign on 
changes in nonagricultural income disagrees with the hypothesized sign. 
I n equat i on (1 ), the estimated coefficient for changes in 
nonagricul t ural income implies for every one million dollar increase in 
nonagricul trual income for the period total cropland wi 11 increase by 
approximately 3.6 acres. The sign on changes in net farm income in 
equation (1), (2), and (3) is incorrect. An incorrect sign in eq uation 
(1) implies that for every one million dollar increase in net farm 
income, total cropland will decline by two hundred and fifty-one acres. 
For the 1974-1978 period, the sign on changes in population and 
changes in nonagri cultura 1 income agree with their hypothesi zed signs. 
26 Jn the equations for total farmland and harvested cropland in 
Table 6 and Table 8, the signs of the coefficients are also 
predominantly negative, although most are not significant. 
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For the two periods 1969-1974 and 1974-1978, R-squares range from 0.27 
to 0.46 (bel ow that for the state data of Table 7 ), and the related F 
statistics are significant at the 0.01 probability level in equations 
(1 ), and (2 ), and the 0.05 1 eve 1 in equation (3 ). 
The equations for the 1969-1978 period, like those of Table 7, 
explain much less (the values of the R-square range from 0.05 to 0.06). 
For the period, none of the "t" statistics are significant . The 
structural changes that occurred in agriculture in the early 1970's 
resulted in poor statistical results when estimating equations for the 
entire period for both county and state data. This is more apparent, at 
least from examining equation (7), (8), and (9), at the county level. 
The coefficients on the 1 and-use control dummy variable are 
consistently negative for the 1969-1974 period, but statistically 
insignificant, are positive for the 1974-1978 period and are significant 
at the 0.05 probability 1 eve l. For the "typi ca 1" county, one may infer 
that the existence of land-use controls resulted in a reduction in the 
total cropland base of some 5,700-5,900 acres during the 1969-1974 
period and an increase in the cropland base of some 20-24 thousand acres 
during the 1974-1978 period. 
The results analyzed so far do not clearly point to either the 
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of land-use controls. In Table (5), 
(7), (8), and (9) for state data, the "t" statistics for the land-
use control dummy are significant for nine of twelve equations covered 
in the period 1974-1978. In each case the sign is opposite to the 
expected sign while the R-squares are poor for every category except for 
changes in total cropland. At the state le vel, land-use controls have 
been ineffective. In Tab 1 e (10 ), (11 ), and (12 ), the 1 and-use contra 1 
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dummy variable has the correct sign in the 1974-1978 period for all land 
categories. The "t" statistics for that period are al 1 significant at a 
minimum 0.10 probability level. However, the R-squares are poor in 
ranging from 0.15 to 0.30. For the 1969-1974 period, the sign is wrong 
on the land-use control dummy for total farmland and total cropland 
while it is correct but statistically insignificant for total harvested 
cropland. The R-squares for the 1969-1974 period suggest that the model 
better exp 1 ai ns changes in the quantity of agri cul tura 1 1 and than for 
the 1974-1978 period. At the county 1 evel, 1 and-use controls are 
statistically effective in the 1974-1978 period, however, the overall 
model is weak. The remaining task is to summarize the overall results 
obtained and the thesis in Chapter VII. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
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The thesis is primarily concerned with the effectiveness of 
agri cu 1 tura 1 1 and-use contro 1 s embodied in the 1 and-use contro 1 dummy 
variable. To accomplish this, changes in the quantity of total 
farmland, total cropland, and total harvested cropland {a subset of 
tota 1 crop 1 and) have been hypothesi zed to be exp 1 ai ned as a function of 
changes in nonagricultural income, changes in net farm income, changes 
in population, changes in government payments, the ratio of agricultural 
land to total land area {the land ratio), and the land-use control 
dummy. If controls have been effective, the sign on the land-use control 
dummy should be positive and be statistically significant, at least at a 
minimum 0.10 probability level. 
At the state level, the regression analysis offers little support 
for or argument against the notion that agricultural land-use controls 
are effective. Generally, the coefficients on the 1 and-use control 
dummy are negative, and where they are positive, they are not 
significant. Those who support such measures will not be pleased with 
these results. The empirical results simply strengthen the theoretical 
arguments against land-use controls presented in Chapter I . Those who 
view such interference- in the 1 and market as potentially damaging may 
take some comfort. One drawback to the state only approach is that it 
does not take into account the possibi 1 ity of existing county 
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legislation. A county analysis, therefore, is required. 
At the county level, the regression analysis offers some support 
that agricultural 1 and use controls are effective. This is for 
the period 1974-1978 for total cropland and total harvested cropland. 
Those who support such measures wi 11 be encouraged with these results. 
Those who oppose such interference in the 1 and market wi 11 not be. 
If viewed from the state level, the resource cost involved in 
passing the agri cul tura 1 1 and-use contra 1 1 egis 1 ati on and admi ni steri ng 
it, even though it is ineffective, may not be trivial. Costs are 
therefore imposed upon society even though the controls are ineffective, 
and they are not significantly influencing land allocation. However, 
the marginal cost of this legislation is probably small relative to the 
misallocation costs imposed if the laws were effective. 
At the county level with the contro l s being somewhat effective, 
this stands in contrast to the theoretical conclusions reached in 
Chapter I. By not a l l owing society to freely determine the amount of 
land to be allocated among the different land-use categories, society is 
not able to maximize its welfare. Therefore, the controls are 
effectively influencing land allocation but not necessarily suiting 
society's best interest. 
In conclusion, there is 1 ittle if any economic justification for 
agricultural land-use control legislation. The evidence for 
agricultural land-use controls is very limited. If anything, the 
current situation may be optimal. Advocates of 1 and-use controls have 
all the legislation they want and are satisfied that agricultural 
resources are being protected while at the same time the market is still 
free to allocate land resources efficiently (for the most part) since 
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the controls are not effectively influencing land allocation. 
Ineffective laws may increase welfare if the marginal benefits that 
advocates of land-use control legislation and the marginal benefits of 
individuals comforted with the fact that the market is efficiently 
allocating land, exceed the marginal costs (or administrative costs) 
incurred in passing the 1 egi sl ati on. If the controls were effective, 
society's welfare would be decreased when the marginal costs of an 
inefficient land allocation, brought about by the land-use controls, are 
accounted for. Given the importance of the issue, only those arguments 
based on scientific reasoning and solid empirical analysis concerning 
agricultural land-use controls, should be entertained since the purpose 
of any investigation should be to present the truth. 
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APPENDIX 
This appendix presents a brief summary of direct and indirect 
agricultural 1 and-use controls for each state that responded to 
information requests. Thirty-nine of forty-eight states responded. 
Alabama 
The State of Alabama has no laws regulating land uses at the state 
level. 
California 
The California Land Conservation Act of 1965 (otherwise known as 
the Williamson Act) brought the state into the area of land-use control 
regulation. The act made clear that the preservation of a maximum 
amount of t he 1 imited supply of agricultural 1 and is necessary to the 
conservation of the state's economic resources. The act calls for the 
state to discourage premature and unnecessary conversion of agricultural 
lands to urban uses, recognizing that in a rapidly urbanizing state 
placing conversion pressure on its agricultural lands, those 
agricultural lands have a definite public value as open space. 
Under article 2.5 of the Wi 11 iamson Act, beginning on 1 January 
1971, any county or city having a general plan may establish 
agricultural preserves. The preserves usually will have a minimum size 
of one hundred acres, but this requirement may be lowered depending upon 
the unique characteristics of the agricultural enterprises i n the area. 
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The county or city that starts a pre serve may by contrac t limit the use 
of the land for the purpose of preserving it for agricultural use . 
Own e rs of land in the preserve are not required to sign the cont r act. 
If they do, the 1 ength of each contract shall be for a term of no 1 ess 
than ten years. If a 1 andowner seeks to cancel a contract, the 
landowner must seek board approval. 
The Open Space Easement Act of 1974 brought together with 
agri cu ltura 1 1 and, other types of 1 and to promote the preservation of 
open space 1 and. To promote the conservation, preservation and 
continued existence of open space 1 ands, the 1 ands brought in are to be 
valued for restrictions and current uses. 
An inventory of prime agricultural land resources must be prepared 
by the State Office of P 1 anni ng and Research. This will a 11 ow the state 
to estimate the amount of prime agricultural land resources that must be 
preserved to maintain the agricultural economy of the state and to 
assure adequate and healthful food for future residents of the state and 
nation. 
Article 4 of the act stipulated that by 31 December 1973, every 
city and county shall prepare and adopt an open-space zoni ng ordinance 
consistent with the local open-space zoning ordinance that each city and 
county has formula ted. 
Col or ado 
Differential assessment was the first state land-use control 
legislation. Adopted in 1964, the particular statute provides that 
agricultural land shall be valued (exclusive of improvements) at a rate 
of 11.5't of its productive capacity . To be assessed as agricultural 
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land, the land must meet the follow i ng requirements: 1) have been used 
the previous two years and presently for monetary profit through 
agricultural activities; 2) or be in the process of being restored 
through conservation practices including resting, deferred grazing, or 
fallowing; 3) and the land must have been classified as eligible for 
classification as agricultural land during the 10 years preceding the 
year of assessment; and 4) the land must continue to have an 
agri cultura 1 use. 27 
The Local Government Land-Use Control Enabling Act of 1974 gave 
1 ocal governments (cities and towns) broadened power to regulate 
development. Th i s additional authority was provided so that local 
governments could protect environmentally unstable areas and to regulate 
1 and use on the basis of its impact upon the community and the 
surrounding areaL In 1975, cities, towns, and counties were authorized 
by the state to adopt and regulate land uses through zoning. 
Connecticut 
In 1963, Public Act 490 was passed by the 1 egisl ature . The act 
declares that it is in the public interest to encourage the preservation 
of farm land so that a readily available source of food and farm 
products can be maintained close to the states metropolitan areas and to 
prevent the forced conversion of farm land to more intensive uses as a 
result of economic pressures caused by farmland property tax assessments 
at values incompatible with the preservation of the farmland . 
The act provides for the assessment of farm, forest, and open space 
27colorado, Department of Agriculture, Inventor~ of Existing 
Co 1 or ado Law Re 1 a ted to Agri cu 1 tura 1 Land Preservat1 on (1 BIT, sec 3, p. 56 . ----- --
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a t its use value ra ther than its cur r ent market valu e. Public Ac t 152 
imposed a percentage fine on agricultural 1 and, held under Public Act 
490, whose use is changed. The ta x ranges from ten percent of the sales 
pri ce if the land is sold during the first year of acquisit i on or 
c lassification, whichever is earlier, declining one percentage point 
each subsequent year unti 1 no conveyance tax is imposed i f the 1 and 
remains open following the end of the tenth year of Public Act 490 
c lassificat i on or ownership wh i chever is earl ier.28 
Delaware 
Del aware's Conservat i on Easement Law was enacted in July , 1978. 
The 1 aw placed 1 imitations , i n the form of restrictions, easements, 
covenants, or by other instruments, on land uses and on the changes that 
could take place for the purpose of protecting land or water areas 
predominant ly in their natural, scenic, recreational, or open condition 
i n agri cultural, farming , forest, or open-space uses. More recently, 
the Delaware Agricultural Lands Preservation Act of 1981 has been 
enacted. Under this act, state pol icy wi 11 be to conserve , protect, and 
enhance the agri cu 1 tura 1 economic base of the state for the production 
of food , f i ber, and fuel. The Delaware Department of Agriculture, in 
cooperation with the Office of Management, Budget, and Planning, must 
review data on the extent of farmland losses. Policies and techniques 
must be recommended by the two agencies to the governor to maintain 
agriculture as an important and viable economic activity. 
28connecti c ut, Depa r tment of Agr ic ulture, Summary £!_Pub l ic Act 490 
(1980 ). 
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Florida 
Florida has several statutes to slow the conversion of agricultural 
county land to other uses. Section 193.461 Florida statutes (The 
"Greenbelt Law" enacted on 1 July 1959) calls for the property 
appraisor(s) to classify all lands in the county for assessment purposes 
as either agricultural or nonagricultural. Land use will determine the 
tax rate, with agricultural use receiving a 1 ower tax rate than 
nonagricultural uses . The latest legislation is the "Right to Farm Law" 
(Section 823.14 Florida Statutes). This nuisance 1 aw (enacted 16 May 
1979) states that a person moving next to an established farming 
operation has no right to complain about noise, odors, etc. generated by 
the workings of the agricultural operation unless it is injurious to 
public health and safety. 
Georgia 
Senate Bill 348 passed in the 1980 session of the Georgia General 
Assembly represents the state's only legislation pertaining to the 
preservation of agricultural 1 and. The 1 aw states that if the 
agricultural land in question was being farmed prior to the 
establishment of the surrounding nonagricultrual uses, the agricultural 
operation is not to be considered a nuisance. 
Illinois 
The state's legislative response to farm land conversion is 
embodied in two pieces of legislation. Public Act 81-1173 (The 
Agricultrual Areas Conservation and Protection Act) took effect on 1 
July 1980. The act provides for the establishment of agricultural and 
protection areas. A county board may establish a county Agricultural 
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Areas Committee whenev er a petition is recei ved by the county board for 
the creation of an agri cultural area. Any owner or owners of 1 and may 
s ubmit a proposal to the county board calling for the creation of an 
agricultural area within the co unty. An agricultural area at it s 
creation , shall not be smaller than five-hundred acres, with the 
territory as compact and contiguous as is possible. Participation in an 
area is voluntary with an initial time length of ten years . 
When any part of a proposed agricultural area is within a 1-1/2 
mile radius of the corporate 1 imits to a municipality, the county board 
mu s t notify the proper authorities in the muni ci pality . If the 
municipality objects to the encroachment of the agricultural area within 
the 1-1 / 2 mi 1 e corporate 1 imit radius, the proposed area shall be 
modified to exclude all area real estate from within the radius. Once 
in an agricultural area, an owner is not absolutely required to stay in 
for the full time. They may petition the county board for early 
withdrawa l provided that the county board is convinced by the owner's 
pre-withdrawal agrument. There exists no penalty for withdrawal from 
the a rea. If a 11 owners no 1 anger des ire to be inc 1 uded in the 
agricultural area after the initial ten years, they may petition the 
county board to dissolve the area. Public Act 82-509 (November, 1981) 
recognizes that, "It is the declared policy of the state to conserve and 
protect and encourage the development and improvement of its 
agricultural 1 and for the production of food and other agricultural 
products ." 29 The Act is essentially a nuisance 1 aw stating that no 
29I llinois, Dep ar tm e nt of Agriculture, Bureau of Farmland 
Protection, Division of Natural Resources, Public Act 82-509 (1982). 
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f arm, no r any of it s appu r t enan ces, sha ll be deemed a nu is an ce if th e 
farm was considered not a nuisance at the t i me its operati ons began and 
has been in operati on at the same site for more than one year regardles s 
of any changed conditions in the surrounding area. 
Indiana 
Only recently (1981) the state passed a 1 aw with respect to 
agriculture. The law is designed to limit the circumstances under which 
agricultural operations may be deemed nuisance. An amendment to the 
1981 act was added during the 1982 legislative session, specifying that 
for an agricultural operat i on not to be deemed a nuisance, it must have 
been continuous 1 y in operation for at 1 east one year on the 1 oca 1 i ty. 
During that one year, there must not have been any significant change in 
either the hours of operation or in the types of operation . The 
operation must also not have been considered a nuisance at the time it 
began its operations on that locality. 
Iowa 
Iowa does not have state leg i slation aimed at preserv i ng 
agri cultural land. The state legislature is considering legislation. 
Kansas 
At present there is no statewide pol icy concerning agricultural 
1 and-use regulation. There are several 1 aws that may indirectly affect 
agri cultural land use. K. S.A. 19-2927 (1951) allows counties that have 
either a f i rst, second , or third c lass c ity located therein to impose 
zon i ng regulation s within any unincorporated territory lying within 
th ree mil es of any such ci ty to promote public health and safety and to 
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conserve and protect property and bui 1 ding values. K.S.A. 19-2929 
(1951) allows county commissioners the right to divide unincorporated 
terri tory into districts to carry out the purposes of K.S.A. 19-2927 and 
to regulate and restrict the construction, modification, or use of 
buildings, structures, or land. 
Maine 
The Farm and Open Space Tax Law of 1975 represents Maine's 
agricultural land preservation legislation. The law provides for the 
valuation of land classified as farmland or open space land based on its 
current use as farmland or open space, rather than its potential fair 
market value for more intensive uses other than agricultural or open 
space. Penal ties wi 11 be assessed for any 1 and-use changes 
disqualifying land from the lower tax rate classification. 
Maryland 
Planning and zoning enabling legislation was adopted in 1950. It 
provided for local government autonomy in planning and zoning (conferred 
pol ice powers). Agricultural use property tax assessment was adopted by 
the state in 1959. In addition, this differential use tax was the first 
of its kind to be established in the nation. Statewide property tax 
credits for preservation 1 and were adopted in 1976. Voluntary 
agricultural districting was initiated in the Maryland Agricultural Land 
Preservation Program in 1977. State legislative action in 1980 resulted 
in the adoption of a transfer of development rights program. 
Massachusetts 
The state acted in 1973 by signing into law legislation aimed at 
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retaining a significant farmland base. The Farmland Assessment Act of 
1973 was designed to remove some of the pressure to sell farmland for 
non-farm uses by permitting actively farmed land to be assessed and 
taxed on its farm use value rather than its potential development value. 
In 1977, the Agricultural Preservation Restriction (APR) Act was 
legislated to offer protection for farmland in the Commonwealth. To be 
eligible, agricultural land lots (1) must be at least five acres in 
size, (2) have produced at least $100 per acre gross sales annually on 
that acreage, and (3) have been in farming for the two consecutive years 
prior to application. It provides farmland owners the opportunity to 
realize the value of the "development rights" of their property.30 The 
farmer capitalizes on the difference between the agricultural and non-
agricultural development values by agreeing to place a permanent 
restriction on his land prohibiting al 1 non-farm development and 
allowing only for agricultural uses. Participation in the program is 
voluntary. 
Minnesota 
The state has enacted legislation addressing the financial 
hardships faced by farmers by placing contraints on agricultural 1 and 
use. In 1976, the Family Farm Security Act was approved to help 
normally ineligible farmers obtain credit to purchase farm real estate 
by guaranteeing loans and differing interest payments. Eligibility 
requirements are numerous. 
To preserve land in agricultural use in the seven-county Twin 
-----3oM_a_s_s_;~husetts, Department of Food and Agriculture, Saving 
Farmland in Massachusetts (1982 ). 
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Cities Metropolitan Area the, Metropolitan Agricultural Preserves Act 
was enacted in 1980. Parti c ipation is voluntary and the program i s 
administered by 1 oca 1 governments which are required to plan and zone 
the 1 and for agricultural use . The farmer-1 andowner may apply to have 
his or her land placed into an agricultural preserve upon completion of 
the planning and zoning phase by local government. The farmer-landowner 
agrees, by written covenant, to keep land in agricultural use 
indefinitely for a minimum of eight years. Leaving the program is the 
result of one of two actions. Either the local authority has changed 
the planning and zoning of land, thus, making it ineligible to stay in a 
result of a farmer-landowner's desire to get out of the program. In the 
program or as either case, the land remains in an agricultural preserve 
for at 1 east eight more years from the date that it is removed frm the 
program. There then follows a two-year period in which the farmer-
landowner may reverse their decision. The act goes on to impose 
property taxes on agri cultura 1 1 and based on the 1 and's appropriate 
agricultural classification and value (differential assessment). 
Right-to-farm legislation becomes effective on 1 January 1983. In 
1982, the · Agricultural Land Preservation Act was enacted, stipulating 
that state policy is to preserve land in agriculture and conserve its 
1 eng-term use for the production of food and other agricultural 
products. This is to be accomplished by protecting agricultural and 
other certain parcels of open space land from conversion, conserving, 
and enhancing soil and water resources to ensure their long-term quality 
and productivity, encouraging the planned growth and development of 
urban and rural areas and by pushing for the ownership and operation of 
agricultural land by resident farmers . 
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Missouri 
No laws exist directly regulating or restricting the uses of 
agricultural land. Two items are being considered by the Missouri 
Legislature. House Bill No. 1447 is an act establishing voluntary 
agricultural districting within the state. Any owner(s) of land may 
submit a proposal to the governing body of any county for the creation 
of an agricultural district, the main purpose of which is to protect 
viable farmland. When considering the formation of an agricultural 
district, the county governing board must consider factors such as 
county development patterns and needs before arriving at a decision. 
The minimum size of a district will be one thousand acres with ten years 
as the initial time length for the contract. Land within the 
agricultural district must be used for agricultural production only, 
with few exceptions a 11 owed. Senate Bi 11 No. 537 is an act designed to 
protect agricultural operations from nuisance suits under certain 
circumstances. 
Montana 
The state of Montana does not have regulations directly relating to 
agricultural land use. Possible indirect legislation is contained in 
regulations indirectly relating to agricultural land use in the Montana 
code annotated Title 76 relating to soil and water conservation. 
Section 76-15-701 concerns the adoption of land-use regulations by 
stating that the supervisors of any soil or water conservation district 
will have the authority to formulate regulations governing land use 
within the district in the interest of 1) conserving soil and water 
resources, and 2) preventing and controlling erosion. 
30 
Poss ible future legislation is embodied in the Montana Conservation 
Districts Division (COD) Resource Conservation Plan, 1981-1985. Changes 
in land use are discussed in two objectives. Objective A calls for the 
provision of local level incentives to keep productive land in 
production. The Montana CDD will assist interested conservation 
districts with the development of agricultural preserve programs. 
Objective 8 calls for the COD to increase support for the preservation 
of prime agricultural land. To accomplish this, the CDD will encourage 
conservation districts to incorporate agricultural land preservation 
programs in their education and information programs. This is meant to 
aid farm and ranch organizations and real estate agencies desiring 
agri cultura 1 1 and preservation. 
Nebraska 
There are no laws dealing with agricultural land-use regulation at 
the state level. 
Nevada 
Legislation (NRS 361A) aimed at assisting agriculture was adopted 
by the Nevada Legislature in July, 1975. NRS 361A allows for reduced 
real property assessments for land devoted and maintained in 
agricultural use. The original intent of the law and constitutional 
amendment was to provide an alternative to owners of agricultural and 
open-space land in urbanizing areas.31 Land could be retained in 
agri cultura 1 or open-space use instead of bowing in to urban deve 1 opment 
31Nevada, Department of Agriculture, Analysis of Nevada's 
Agricultural Tax Deferral Program (1982) NRS Chapter 101A. 
pressure cau sed by hi gh pro perty ta xes based on the l and' s potential 
mark et va 1 ue. 
New Hampshire 
81 
The State of New Hampshire has no regulations or laws favoring 
agricultural land use. Several communities have adopted zoning 
ordinances to deal with agricultural land use. 
New Jersey 
The state does not have any legislation relating to agricultural 
land preservat i on. Most legislation i s embod i ed at the muni ci pality 
level. Two bills are currently pending in the state legislature. The 
first is Senate bill No. 3233 introduced on 14 May 1981. This bill 
would authorize the creation of state debt by the issuance of bonds in 
the sum of $50,000,000.00 for the purchase of development easements on 
farmland and to pro vi de state mate hi ng funds for soi 1 and water 
con s ervation projects . Senate Bi 11 No. 3479 concerns agricultural 
development and farmland preservation. The bill establishes the state 
agriculture development committee and provides for the establishment of 
county agriculture development boards which would provide for the 
establishment of voluntary agricultural districts. 
On 31 October 1980, a state study was released forwarding proposals 
for agricultural land retention and a development program in the state. 
The study recommended that a series of actions be taken to solidify the 
agricultural 1 and base and the farming industry in New Jersey. These 
actions are to provide for 1) a state and local commitment to 
agriculture by providing encouragement and assistance, 2 ) voluntary 
parti c ipation i n limited te r m agri c ulture districts, 3) local 
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i mplementat i on of land planning te c hnique s , 4) compensation for 
development r ights given up permanently, and 5) an interlocking series 
of activities that would provide for a system of checks and balances to 
maximize the potential for the future of farming in New Jersey. 
New Mexico 
Recently, the state enacted into 1 aw 1 egis 1 ati on dea 1 i ng with the 
issue of agricultural land preservation. In 1981, the state legislature 
passed a right-to-farm bill (Senate Bill 408), the purpose of which is 
to conserve, protect, encourage, develop, and improve agricultural 1 and 
for the production of agricultural commodities and to reduce losses from 
the state's agricultural resources by stipulating under what conditions 
agri cu 1 tura 1 operations may be deemed a nuisance. 
New York 
State agricultural land-use legislation came into existence in 
1971, with the Agricultural Districts Law. That law stipulates it is 
the declared policy of the state to conserve, protect, and to encourage 
the development and improvement of its agricultural lands for the 
production of food and other agri cu 1 tura 1 products. Typic a 1 contract 
length for a district is eight years. Every eight years, the 
agricultural district must be reviewed, and if strong demand exists for 
non-farm uses, the district may be reduced in size or eliminated. Lower 
use value assesments associated with agricultural land use are available 
to farmers by keeping their 1 and in agricultural production. Farmers 
not located in the original agricultural district are also eligible for 
ta x relief through differential use value assessment. These farmers 
sign a committment stipulating that they will remain in farming for 
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eight years. Ta x penalities are to be imposed upon farmers desiring 
withdrawal from the agricultural districts . 
North Dakota 
No state level legislation regulating the use of agricultural land 
exists currently. Several counties do, however, have some zoning . 
Ohio 
The Current Agricultural Use Valuation (CAUV) Act became effective 
on 26 July 1974, with rules effective beginning with the 1975 tax year. 
Under CAUV, landowners may have their land assessed at its use value for 
agricultural purposes rather than the current market value. Recent 
legislation has greatly expanded the extent of agricultural land-use 
controls and regulations. Sub S.B. 78 calls for the establishment of 
agricultural districts to preserve land in agriculture exempting land in 
the districts from the collection of specified utility assessments, the 
provision of additional benefits to land in those districts, forbidding 
county and township zoning from restricting certain farm markets, and 
provides l andowners the right to farm by excluding generally accepted 
agricultural practices from air pollution laws, certain nuisance 
statutes, rules, and ordinances. 
Any person who owns agri cultura 1 1 and may app 1 y to have their 1 and 
placed in the district by meeting several qualifying factors. 
Withdrawing land from a district during the five (5) year contract time 
subjects the landowner to a withdrawal penalty to be calculated by the 
county auditor. 
Oklahoma 
Legislation was adopted in 1972 concerning the valuation of 
property for taxation purposes. Right-to-farm 1 egis 1 ati on was adopted 
on 1 October 1980. The Oklahoma Feed Yard Act of 1981 may be considered 
an extension of the 1980 nuisance law. In that law, special emphasis is 
placed on the conditions for a feed yard not to be considered a 
nuisance. 
Oregon 
The effective farm use (EFU) zone was developed by the legislature 
in 1961. Also in that year, the farm tax deferral program was begun. 
The zones are used in rural farm areas and their primary purpose is to 
provide an area where farming can take place free from interference. 
However, it is recognized that EFU zoning substantially limits 
alternative uses of agri cul tura 1 1 and. Therefore, various incentives 
and priv i leges are to be provided for farmers. Some of these incentives 
and privileges are 1) assurance that only compatible nonfarm uses will 
be allowed within the EFU zone, 2) nuisance or right-to-farm 
legislation, 3) no minimum income requirement to be earned in three out 
of the five preceding ca 1 en dar years to qua 1 i fy for speci a 1 farm-use 
assessment, and 4) farm use valuation for inheritance tax purposes. The 
major extent of legislation passed occurred in the mid 1970's, when the 
Statewide Planning Goals and Guide Lines were released by the Oregon 
Land Conservation and Deve 1 opment Commission (LCDC ). Goa 1 s number three 
and fourteen (enacted December 1974) are especially relevant to 
agricultural land use. Goal number three calls for agricultural lands 
to be preserved and maintained for farm use, consistent with existing 
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and future needs for agricultural products, forest, and open space. In 
addition, EFU zoning coverage was substantially expanded on. Goal 
number fourteen ca 11 s for urban growth boundaries (UGB) to be 
established to identify and separate urban 1 and from rural 1 and. Cities 
and counties are to cooperate in the establishment of the UGBs. This is 
to 1) assure orderly economic provision for public facilities and 
services, 2) meet LCDC goals, and 3) to encourage development within 
urban areas before conversion of rural areas. 
Pennsylvania 
There exists a wide variety of laws through which the state can 
influence and/or change land-use trends. The first law (Act) was 
introduced in 1966. Act 515 enables Pennsylvania counties to covenant 
with landowners to preserve land in farm, forest, water supply, or open 
space by taxing 1 and according to its use value rather than the 
prevailing market valu~ Act 207 stipulates farmland is to be valued at 
its use value rather than the market value for inheritance tax purposes. 
If land use is changed within seven years after the death of the 
ori gina 1 owner of the 1 and, pen a 1 ties may be imposed. 
Zoning was legislated into existence in 1968 by Act 284, which 
authorized local municipalities to establish zoning ordinances for the 
"protection and preservation of natural resources and agricultural land 
and activities". Legislation passed into law in 1968 allows the state 
and its counties to acquire land through purchase, contract, 
condemnation, or gift so that they may preserve, acquire, or hold land 
for open space use including farming. 
Act 71 (1976) exempts farmers from being charged for municipal 
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improvements, such as the installation of water and sewer 1 ines. 
Landowners may petition for the creation of agricultural areas to local 
government(s) through Act 43 (1981 ). These val untary agricultural areas 
would have a minimum size of five hundred acres of viable farm land. 
Various incentives to keeping land in and disincentives from 
transferring land out of the area are provided for in the act. 
Rhode Island 
-----
The state's legislation consists of two acts. In 1980, the Farm, 
Forest, and Open Space Ac t was passed by the General Assembly. The act 
recognizes that as the protecter of the pub 1 i c interest, the state must 
encourage the preservation of farm, forest, and open-space land in order 
that an available source of food and other farm products is maintained 
close to the state's metropolitan areas. The state must actively seek 
to prevent the forced conversion of farm 1 and, forest, and open space. 
To achieve the goal of preventing forced conversion, the state is to 
employ use value assessment of land. Use value assessment is based on 
the current undeveloped value of the land rather than the "highest and 
best use possible." 
To qualify as farmland, land parcels must be larger than five acres 
in size and should be actively devoted to agricultural use. If the land 
is taken out of the program and/or is developed, the farmer is then 
subject to a development and land-use change tax. The amount of the tax 
is a percentage value of the fair market value of the developed land, 
and it is only estimated at the time when the land is either ineligible 
or is voluntarily withdrawn from use value assessment. Act H5691 
(Farmland Preser vation Act of 1981) instead of vaguely suggesting that 
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the state must preserve agricultural land and prevent forced conversion, 
suggests that the state acquire the development rights of existing 
farmland to insure that there will be an adequate amount of land for 
farming, open spaces, and ground water recharge areas. 
South Carolina 
The state has no laws pertaining to land-use regulations in 
agriculture. Several 1 aws provide incentives to retaining 1 and in 
agricultural production. In 1980, a state law colllllonly referred to as 
the "Righ-to-Farm Law," was passed. The 1 aw was passed by the General 
Assembly to protect farmers from undue hardships such as nuisance suits 
resulting from the normal every day operations of a farm. 
Act 208 (1975) calls for a use value assessment for property taxes 
on farmland. The tax is based on a four percent assessment of the fair 
market value for agricultural use. Once the farm landowner has applied 
for and is receiving the preferential assessment treatment, a decision 
to change the land use to some nonagricultural use activity will subject 
the owner to "rol 1-back taxes" for the year that the changes takes place 
and for the five years preceding i~ 
South Dakota 
-----
According to the Division of Conservation of the South Dakota 
Department of Agriculture, no agricultural land-use legislation exists. 
Texas 
The state recently (5-13-81, Senate Bill 488) enacted into law a 
"Right-to-Farm Act" that ensures the right to farm by providing for 
limitations on nuisance actions, regulations, rules, and zoning 
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requirments concerning certain agricultural operations. No nuisance 
action shall be brought against an agricultural operation which has 
lawfully been in operation for one year or more prior to the date of 
such action, where the conditions or circumstances complained of as 
constituting the basis for the nuisance action have existed 
substantially unchanged since the established date of operation. The 
act formulates a new state pol icy to conserve, protect, and encourage 
the developement and improvement of its agricultural commodities. This 
implies that the state must make efforts to reduce agricultural resource 
losses . 
Utah 
At the present time, no state laws or regulations regulating or 
influencing the use of agricultural 1 and exist. 
Vermont 
State 1 aws / programs relating to the protection of farmland came 
into existence in Title 24, Chapter 117 of the state laws. Title 24, 
Chapter 117 (1967) enables towns that have adopted a town plan and have 
established a planning commission to enact zoning ordinances. This 
allows towns to include in their zoning agricultural use zones whether 
they be exclusive or non-exclusive. Use value assessment designed to 
benefit 1 andowners who are wi 11 i ng to make a 1 ong term commitment to 
keep their land in agricultural production, was added in 1977. In 1980, 
Executive Order 52 directed state agencies and state instrumentalities 
to avoid adversely impacting the preservation of agricultural 1 ands 
through their actions. Right-to-Farm legislation was adopted in 1981. 
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Virginia 
In the last two years, Virginia has passed into l aw si x laws 
dealing wi th the use of agricultural 1 and (four bi 11 s in 1981 and two in 
1982 ). House Bi 11 No. 1654 (3 March 1981) grants public bodies the 
necessary authority to acquire or designate land for use as open space. 
The land may be acquired by bequest, devise, gift, grant, or purchase 
for not 1 ess than five years duration. The bi 11 negates the use of 
eminent domain rights to land acquired for the purpose of open space, 
but it does not 1 imit the power of eminent domain in other cases . 
House Bill No. 1428 (20 March 1981) is similar to legislation in other 
states by declaring that state pol icy is to conserve, protect and 
encourage the development and continued improvment of its agricultural 
1 and for the production of food and other agricultural products. It 
goes on to redefine nuisance laws with respect to agricultural 
operations such that no agricultural operation, or its appurtenanc es, 
shal 1 be deemed a nuisance due to any change of conditions in the 
surrounding area if it has been in operation for more than one year. 
This new nuisance interpretation does not affect the right of any 
person, corporation, or firm to seek payments resulting from orignial 
damages sustained by them. House Bill No . 1656 (21 March 1981) 
encourages 1 ocal governments to create comprehensive plans to improve 
public health and safety and plan for the preservation of agricultural 
and forestal land. Zoning ordinances and districts are to be drawn with 
reasonable consideration to any existing land-use plan, current land-use 
trends and designed 1 and-use patterns, with the goal of assuring the 
"most appropriate" use of land throughout the county or municipality. 
Chapter 3.2 of House Bi 11 No. 1655 (2 Apri 1 1981) deals with the 
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preservation of prime agricultural 1 and . It is pointed out that the 
actions of various state agencies account for a significant portion of 
the prime agricultural land converted to nonagricultural use. To stop 
this wherever possbile, state policies and actions should encourage the 
preservation of prime farmland. 
House Bi 11 No. 523 (9 February 1982) is a House Amendemnt to H.S. 
No. 1655. Prime agricultural land now is referred to as "important 
farmlands," which can be broken down into prime farmland, unique 
farmland, and farmland other than prime or unique farmlands. Under 
Senate Bi 11 No. 355 (19 February 1982 ), an agricultural and forestal 
districts advisory committee was established to review requests for the 
formation of agricultural or forestal districts. Participation in the 
districts is voluntary. Minimum size of a district parcel is twenty-
five acreL The intial district contract length is for eight years, but 
landowners no longer desiring to participate in the district may file a 
written notice of termination with the local governing body which 
created the district. A withdrawal tax penalty exists in that real 
estate previously included in the district is subject to roll-back 
taxes . 
Washington 
Wahington's first legislation was the Open Space Taxation Act of 
1970. Under this act, a voluntary incentive program would be developed 
to assess eligible farm, timber, or open space lands at their current 
use value rather than at their highest and best value. Amendments to 
the Open Space Taxation Act were added on in 1973. Additional laws were 
enacted in 1979. They were the State Inheritance Ta x 1 aw (Ch. 209, Laws 
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of 1979), the Farmland Assessment Relief Law (Ch. 84, Laws of 1979), the 
Nui sa nce Law (Ch. 122, Laws of 19 79), and the Boundary Review Law (Ch. 
142, Laws of 1979). The State Inheritance Tax Law allows current use 
valuation rather than fair market valuation for closely owned family 
businesses and farms. The Farmland Assessment Relief Law was designed 
to discourage the spread of certain urban type improvements onto open 
space agricultural land . The Nuisance Law states that agricultural 
activities conducted on farmland, if consistent with established 
practices and established prior to any surrounding nonagricultural 
activities, will be considered reasonable and will not constitute a 
nu i sance unless they jeopardize public health and safety. The boundary 
Review 1 aw states that when considering annexations, Boundary Review 
Boards must take into account the existence and use(s) of agricultural 
soils. More recently, cities and counties have been granted the power 
to implement land plannin~ 
West Virginia 
The state passed legislation dealing with preserving land in 
agricultural use in H.B. 1109 (July 1981 ). The act is designed to 
grant inheritance tax relief to inheriting family members of a farm 
where the principle owner has passed away. The tax will be assessed on 
the current use value rather than the fair market value of the property. 
H.B. 1216 (May, 1982) allows county commissions the option of developing 
and implementing farmland preservation schemes with voluntary 
participation in the program. H.B. 2020 (June, 1982) stipulates that it 
is the state's duty to preserve and protect agricultural production as 
it is a necessity to the welfare and common good of the state's citizens. 
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Nuisance suits cannot be brought against agricultural operations unless 
the complaintants land-use existed before the neighboring agricultural 
production operations began and if the conduct of the agricultural 
operation being complained about has or will cause actual physical 
damage to the complaintant or the complaintant's property. 
Wisconsin 
State concern about agriculture resulted in the passage of the 
Farmland Preservation Act on 29 June 1977. The a act was passed to 
assist local people who want to preserve farmland, and to provide tax 
relief to farmers who participate in the local programs. It is a two 
stage bill, with stage I to run from 1977 to 1982 and stage II from 1982 
and on. Under stage I, farmers can qualify for tax credits against 
their state income tax in two ways; 1) if their land is zoned for 
exclusive agricultural use or 2) by signing a contract agreeing not to 
develop their land for a specified period of time. 
The income tax credit is based on household income. The lower the 
particular farmer's income, the higher the tax credit, implying an 
inverse relationship between the farmer's income and the tax credit. 
Property taxes up to $6000 are eligible for tax relief. If the farmer's 
parcel is eligible for stage II but the farner chooses not to participate 
in the plan, then they must pay back the credits received through stage 
I. Under stage II, farmers may qualify for income tax credits without 
having to sign a contract by participating in exclusive farm-use zoning, 
provided that the local zoning meets the standards in the law for 
protecting farmland. Stage II imposes penalites upon farmers that do not 
review their contract, in that if the contract expires, the farmer(s) 
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must repay the tax credits granted in the previous ten years in two 
ways; 1) pay back in a year of contract nonrenewa 1 and face no interest 
or 2) pay later and face a six percent interest charge . Tax credits 
after 1982 will only be available to those farmers whose land is in 
exclusive agricultural use or in an approved county plan preservation 
district. 
Wyoming 
The state of Wyoming does not have specific laws relating to 
agricultural land use. 
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